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ARTICLES

Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power
RECONFIGURING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STRUCTURES
FROM THE GROUND UP
Wendy A. Bach†
INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, I was sitting across the table from a group of
lawyers representing the New York City welfare department. We were
discussing monitoring a settlement, negotiated after six, hard-fought
years of litigation. Like most test-case litigation, the case consumed, over
the years, enormous advocacy resources from multiple financially
strapped and woefully understaffed legal services offices. The case
concerned the means by which the department provided welfare-to-work
services for welfare recipients who wanted to go to school; the settlement
contained extensive and detailed requirements about how the interactions
between our clients and the city would proceed. As plaintiffs‟ counsel,
we used the lawsuit as a tool to enhance welfare recipients‟ access to
education. And more broadly, like the last decade of welfare advocates‟
work, the litigation was part of our efforts to fight against a web of
mechanisms designed to force poor women off of assistance in a
continuing effort to “end welfare as we [knew] it.”1 The settlement was
drafted as is typical in these cases: if a class member with characteristics
1, 2 or 3 said X, the department had to do Y unless A, B, or C was true
†
Faculty, CUNY School of Law. I owe thanks to many colleagues, members of the
CUNY Faculty as well as to the school for its financial support of this project. I am particularly
grateful to Sameer Ashar, Rebecca Bratspies, Sue Bryant, Matthew Diller, Stephen Loffredo, Andrea
McCardle, Brooke Richie, Ruthann Robson, and the participants in a Spring 2008 CUNY Faculty
Forum for their invaluable feedback and editing assistance. In addition, thanks go to Bao Chao
Ruland, Dawn Philip, Stephanie Sampalis, Sally Curan, Megan Stewart, Shalini Deo, and Anthony
Cardoso as well as the wonderful staff of the Brooklyn Law Review for their research and editing
assistance. And finally, thanks to Carol O‟Donnell for her consistent support.
1
Clinton‟s famous pledge was originally made during his 1992 presidential campaign,
R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 127 (2000), and reiterated in his 1993 State
of the Union Address. See 139 CONG. REC. H674, 676 (1993).
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and so on. Every term had been carefully negotiated to increase
educational access and to afford procedural and substantive rights to
class members.
During this particular conversation, the parties turned to the topic
of how to monitor the specific terms of the settlement when the terms
were to be carried out by private entities under contract to the city. When
we questioned how we could monitor the vendor‟s compliance with the
settlement provisions, the city‟s attorney looked across the table and said
without hesitation, “We can‟t monitor them. We don‟t know what they
are doing or how they are doing it. We just know about outcomes like
job placement.” Although we worked our cumbersome way through this
problem for the purpose of that litigation, in that moment I realized that
there was an elephant in the room. The contractors, who provided
services to huge swaths of the plaintiff class, were motivated by the
terms of their contract and the monthly contract monitoring sessions
conducted by the city and not by any of our carefully negotiated words.
At best, our effects were secondarily removed. So we had a problem.
The more I thought about this problem, the more I realized that it
centered around a fundamental mismatch between current modes of
governance in public welfare programs and the tools used by advocates
in their efforts to fight on behalf of their clients. The tools designed in
response to New Deal and post-New Deal governance structures were
becoming increasingly ineffective.
This Article addresses this mismatch between the law and
traditional advocacy methods in the context of the privatization of the
state‟s welfare functions.2 Beginning with the recognition that
privatization, in the form of contracting out, is a significant and growing
trend in welfare administration, this Article asks a series of questions.
For example, from an administrative law perspective, how does
privatization, and specifically the contracting out of welfare programs,
affect the ability of poor communities to participate in the formulation of
welfare policy?3 Similarly, how effective are current administrative law
tools in fostering accountability, and to the extent that those tools are not
effective at creating points of intervention in policy making for poor
communities, what tools might be effective?
2
Although some academics have begun to raise this issue and some organizations have
begun to tackle this problem, our collective strategy on this issue remains underdeveloped. See infra
Parts II-III.
3
The efficacy and wisdom of turning to private entities to administer all or part of
welfare programs in specific, and the overwhelming role of privatization in governance in general, is
subject to substantial debate and raises tremendously important questions. While I do not address
these questions, the case study and other examples in this Article support many of the concerns
about this governmental strategy that others articulate. For some important discussions of the threats
of privatization, see Orly Lobel, Rethinking Traditional Alignments: Privatization and Participatory
Citizenship, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS: RETHINKING IDEOLOGY
AND STRATEGY 209, 210 (Clare Dalton ed., 2007); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1246-54 (2003); Paul Starr, The
Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL‟Y REV. 6 passim (1988).
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Part I, relying on a case study of welfare privatization in New
York City, illustrates how the dominance of contracting out has radically
changed the mode of governance in public welfare programs, shifting it
from law and regulation to contracts and contract monitoring.
Privatization in this context, without any public input or initial scrutiny,
has resulted in a program that imposes highly punitive welfare policies
and fails to meet the needs of the poor for education and jobs.
Part II examines whether either administrative law or the market
currently offers effective mechanisms for public participation in this new
form of administrative governance. This Part concludes that neither the
market itself nor administrative accountability tools, as currently
configured, are effective at creating accountability for poor communities.
Part III explores new collaborative governance structures. These
structures provide a fruitful conceptual basis for creating a politically
feasible and effective governance structure. However, the history of
subordination and disproportionate power that characterizes social
welfare history raises serious questions about the ability of poor
communities to participate effectively in these collaborative endeavors.
As a result, Part III argues that we must design new mechanisms to
enable substantive community participation. Finally, Part IV suggests
that the creation of robust, community-controlled monitoring bodies can
address the accountability4 problems of governance by contract.
I.

CASE STUDY: WELFARE REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION IN NEW
YORK CITY

A.

The National Context: A Move Toward Privatization

The privatization5 of the United States public assistance
provision system through contracting has accelerated dramatically in the
last ten years. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
4

In this Article, the term “accountability” refers to government and private partners‟
accountability to the public in general, and poor communities in particular, for the creation and
implementation of welfare policy that can positively affect lives. The myriad of individuallyfocused, non-accountability issues that arise in privatized welfare services is not the Article‟s focus.
For example, this Article focuses on structures that would facilitate government transparency and
participation by community-based organizations in a policy setting rather than on how individual
welfare recipients might challenge the actions of a private entity providing services. For discussions
of these individual rights questions, see, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era
of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 passim (2001); David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a
Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 279-306 (1998).
5
The term “privatization” covers a broad range of mechanisms, including the complete
divestiture of assets by the government, deregulation, the use of vouchers paid for by the
government to buy particular commodities in the private market, and contracting between the
government and private entities, as well as other measures. See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and
Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1519 (2001) (citing Ronald Cass,
Privatization: Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988)); see also JOEL F.
HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT
6-7 (1996). This Article addresses only privatization through contracting between administrative
agencies and private entities.
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Reconciliation Act of 1996 (hereinafter “PRA”) eliminated Aid to
Families With Dependent Children (hereinafter “AFDC”) and its
guarantee of minimal subsistence, and created Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (hereinafter “TANF”) in its stead.6 Importantly, the PRA
joined a rising tide of initiatives to “reinvent government” by using
private sector tools and entities to free government from the constraints
of what was seen as excessive bureaucracy and constrictive civil service
rules.7 Throughout the country, state and local jurisdictions have turned
to the private sector to respond to the challenges posed by the PRA. In
the welfare-to-work area, privatization has been a major tool in a very
effective campaign to significantly reduce the welfare rolls. Today, the
full range of services, from eligibility determinations to welfare-to-work
services, are being conducted not directly by government entities but by
private, often large, for-profit corporate entities.8 Although contracting
had always played some role in the provision of welfare-to-work
services, the entrance of large, for-profit corporations, the scale of
contracting out in some jurisdictions, and the focus on performancebased contracting, has significantly altered this landscape.
The move to privatization arose in large part from two
significant shifts in federal law. In 1996, the federal government invited
states to use private entities to provide services and to use virtually any
means at their disposal to lower the welfare rolls.9 These changes created
an ideal environment for a large growth in the role of private entities.
The PRA included a provision allowing states and localities to contract
out eligibility determinations,10 creating a new and potentially
6

42 U.S.C. § 601 (2001).
See, e.g., M. BRYNA SANGER, THE WELFARE MARKETPLACE: PRIVATIZATION AND
WELFARE REFORM 2 (2003) (“Most states and localities have been seizing the opportunities
provided by a loosening of federal mandates, responsibilities, and authorities to restructure the
arrangements for provision of services.”); see also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare
Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 112329 (2000) (describing the prominent role of the private sector and private sector management
techniques in the administration of welfare programs after 1996 and arguing that these changes are
decreasing opportunities to hold government accountable).
8
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-245, WELFARE REFORM: INTERIM REPORT
ON POTENTIAL WAYS TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF STATE AND LOCAL CONTRACTING 3
(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02245.pdf [hereinafter GAO, WELFARE
REFORM]. In 2005, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia did some contracting of welfare-towork services at the state or local level. SONDRA YOUDELMAN WITH PAUL GETSOS, COMMUNITY
VOICES HEARD, THE REVOLVING DOOR: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON NYC‟S EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
AND PLACEMENT SYSTEM AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN MOVING PEOPLE FROM WELFARE TO WORK
21 (2005), available at http://www.cvhaction.org/reports (follow link to The Revolving Door—Full
Report.pdf) [hereinafter THE REVOLVING DOOR].
9
42 U.S.C § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2001).
10
Id. § 604a(a)(1) (“A State may . . . administer and provide services under the [TANF]
program[] . . . through contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations; and . . . provide
beneficiaries of assistance under the [TANF] program[] . . . with certificates, vouchers, or other
forms of disbursement which are redeemable with such organizations.”). As a practical matter, the
PRA‟s allowance of the contracting out of eligibility determinations was limited, to a certain extent,
by the federal government‟s refusal to allow the contracting out of eligibility determinations for food
stamps and Medicaid. For example, in 1997 the Clinton administration denied a request from Texas
7
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tremendously lucrative market for the for-profit sector.11 Second, and
equally significantly, the statute moved power for setting welfare policy
from the federal government to states and localities, a trend generally
referred to as “devolution.”12 The PRA envisioned widespread state and
local experimentation and, in many ways, paralleled the incentive-based
contracts that would emerge in the welfare-to-work arena. States were
given a fixed sum of money (the sum they received under the AFDC
program in 1995), few mandates, and enormous motivation to lower their
welfare caseloads by any means they saw fit.13 The message from the
federal government to the states was crystal clear: if you manage to cut
the welfare rolls, you will be rewarded financially, and, to a far greater
degree than under the AFDC program, we will not hold you accountable
for the means by which you achieved this goal.14 These twin invitations,
to use private entities to provide services and to use virtually any means

to contract out its TANF program on the grounds “that it would empower private sector employees
to determine eligibility for Medicaid and Food Stamps.” Kennedy, supra note 4, at 231 (citing White
House Limits States in Privatizing Welfare, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1997, at A20).
11
See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run State Welfare
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at 1; Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services:
Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 89 (2003). For a more extensive
discussion of the role of privatization in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (“PRA”) and in particular the move to inclusion of for-profit entities in the
provision of welfare programs, see Kennedy, supra note 4, at 256-67.
12
See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2001); see also infra notes 13 & 15.
13
The welfare law was touted as promoting devolution and, to a certain extent, it did
leave states room to experiment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (describing the purpose of the
legislation as “to increase the flexibility of States”). However, state flexibility was limited by a series
of significant constraints on the ability of the states to provide assistance. For example, states were
barred from providing TANF-funded benefits to many lawful immigrants, were not permitted to
provide federally funded benefits for more than five years, and were constrained in a variety of ways
from providing these benefits to teenage parents and to parents who failed to comply with work and
child support requirements. Id. §§ 608-609 (Supp. III 1997).
Principle among the changes embodied in federal welfare reform was the concept of
“devolution”—a devolving of authority for programmatic design from the federal government to the
states. This principle is embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 601, which describes the purpose of the program as
“increas[ing] the flexibility of States in operating a program designed to” meet the purposes of the
statute and which eliminates any individual entitlement to receive benefits under the program. Id. §
601 (Supp. III 1997).
14
Although there is no question that the PRA called for devolution of power on a much
larger scale than earlier welfare programs, Joel Handler argued persuasively that throughout the
twentieth century the United States has consistently delegated administration of social welfare
programs to lower levels of government when the subjects of the program are socially categorized as
“undeserving.” HANDLER, supra note 5, at 49.
When there is agreement on the deservingness of the category, the program is federally
administered and fairly routine. On the other hand, when welfare is controversial, and
when controversies boil up and demand upper-level attention . . . the preferred response,
from the perspective of the legislature, is to try to escape political costs by granting
symbolic victories and delegating the controversy back down to the local level.
Id.
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at their disposal to lower the rolls, created an ideal environment for a
large growth in the role of private entities.15
And grow it did. The most recent national survey, released in
2002 by the United States General Accounting Office, reported that in
2001, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia used contracts with
private entities to provide some welfare services.16 Nationwide spending
in 2001 exceeded $1.5 billion, which represented at least 13% of total
federal TANF and state maintenance-of-effort expenditures, excluding
expenditures for cash assistance.17 And not only did the general use of
private entities grow, but the use of for-profit entities grew exponentially.
By 2001, 13% of the $1.5 billion given to private entities to operate
TANF and TANF-related programs went to for-profit entities.18
B.

New York City: Welfare Reform and the Move Toward
Privatization

Welfare reform of the kind envisioned by the PRA began in
earnest in New York City prior to passage of the federal law. In 1995,
then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and then-Human Resources Commissioner
Jason Turner created the work experience program (“WEP”) and
predicated eligibility for public assistance on participation in WEP for
thirty-five hours per week.19 Along with WEP, Giuliani and Turner
changed the “culture” of welfare offices by establishing Eligibility
Verification Review, a system that mandated that recipients repeatedly
verify factors related to eligibility, and by converting Income Support

15
For a discussion of the interlinking roles of privatization, devolution and reinvention
of government in an array of social service contexts, see Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 160-64 (2000).
16
See GAO, WELFARE REFORM, supra note 8, at 8.
17
Id. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, or TANF, is the name of the federal
program created by the PRA. Under the terms of the PRA, in order to draw down federal TANF
funds, states were required to spend on TANF or TANF-like programs 75% (or in some
circumstances 80%) as much as they contributed toward federal welfare assistance—the Aid to
Dependent Children program—in 1994. 45 C.F.R. § 263.1 (2006). This is referred to as the
“Maintenance of Effort” (“MOE”) requirements. Id. § 263.30. Thus, the GAO‟s use of the combined
TANF and MOE dollars to calculate the scale of privatization accurately reflects the minimum
amount states were spending on privatized welfare services in 2001. In addition, because some states
actually regularly spend more on TANF and TANF-related goals than they need to in order to meet
the federal MOE requirement, the GAO estimate is probably low. See, e.g., E-mail from Trudi
Renwick, Senior Economist, Fiscal Policy Institute, to Wendy A. Bach, Instructor, City University
of New York School of Law (Nov. 16, 2007, 10:02 AM EST) (on file with author) (citing data
provided to Ms. Renwick from the New York State Division of the Budget showing that New York
State MOE spending exceeded required MOE spending in federal fiscal years from 2001-2006 in
sums ranging from $51 million to $703 million per year).
18
GAO, WELFARE REFORM, supra note 8, at 8. An in-depth discussion of the
significance of the entrance of the for-profit sector in welfare services is outside the scope of this
Article. For an interesting discussion of this topic, see SANGER, supra note 7, at 72-97.
19
COMM. ON SOCIAL WELFARE LAW, NEW YORK CITY BAR, WELFARE REFORM IN NEW
YORK CITY: THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS § I.C (Aug. 2001), http://www.abcny.org/Publications/
reports/show_html.php?rid=41 [hereinafter WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY].
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Centers to Job Centers.20 Welfare reform was designed to create “a crisis
in welfare recipients‟ lives, precipitating such dire prospects as hunger
and homelessness.”21
The move to privatization in New York City came a few years
later. In 1999, the Giuliani administration put out for bid $500 million in
contracts to provide welfare-to-work services for public assistance
recipients.22 Privatization of welfare-to-work services proceeded and
expanded over the next several years with contracts to provide
employment assessments, services for individuals who alleged physical
and mental impairments that interfered with their ability to work, and a
variety of other services.23 The contracts were generally performancebased, paying contractors only when they met performance goals for a
particular client.24
1. The Advocacy Community Responds to Welfare Reform
Central among the advocacy community‟s strategies to combat
welfare reform were the filing of class action law suits to stop or slow the
implementation of key welfare reform initiatives and a series of lobbying
and organizing efforts to blunt the harshest effects of reform.25 The
litigation successfully slowed implementation of welfare reform,
ensuring some adherence to both due process and substantive rights in
the implementation of reform.26 Similarly, lobbying efforts resulted in the

20

Id. § II.A.1.
Id. (citing Commissioner Jason Turner, Address at the Nelson A. Rockefeller Inst. of
Gov‟t (Nov. 1998)).
22
See id.
23
See generally, e.g., THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8 (discussing contracting out of
assessment and welfare-to-work services); ALEXA KASDAN WITH SONDRA YOUDELMAN,
COMMUNITY VOICES HEARD, FAILURE TO COMPLY: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN DESIGN AND
IMPLEMENTATION IN HRA‟S WECARE PROGRAM (2007) [hereinafter FAILURE TO COMPLY],
available at http://cvh.mayfirst.org/files/WeCareReportFinal.pdf (discussing the privatization of
HRA‟s disability assessment process). This growth in welfare contracting was part of an overall
expansion of human services contracting during this period in New York City. See, e.g., SUSAN
BUTTENWIESER, CITY PROJECT BULLETIN, FOCUS ON CONTRACTING (Dec. 2000)
http://www.cityproject.org/publications/contracting/2000-12-31.html (stating that in 2000 human
services contracting was over $4.2 billion or 11% of New York City‟s budget).
24
See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
25
See WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19, § II (describing a series of
problems with the welfare system and the litigation that responded to that problems); see also infra
notes 31-34 and accompanying text (describing organizing efforts around welfare). Among the
litigation efforts was Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), which challenged
the conversion of welfare centers from Income Support Centers to “Job Centers” on the ground that
the agency was “preventing people from applying for Medicaid, food stamps, cash assistance, and
emergency assistance in violation of federal and state statutory and constitutional law.” WELFARE
REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19, § II.A.1. For an in-depth look at the litigation efforts of
the advocacy community from 1996 forward, see Nat‟l Ctr. for Law and Econ. Justice, Case
Developments (1996-2004), http://www.nclej.org/courts-case-dev.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
26
WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19.
21
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preservation of some protections that had been assured under AFDC.27
Nevertheless, welfare reform, evaluated solely on the basis of whether
welfare rolls plummeted, was significantly more successful. Between
1995 and 2006, the welfare rolls in New York City plummeted an
astounding sixty-five percent.28 If parallel economic improvements by
former welfare recipients accompanied those roll reductions, advocates
could have concurred with the administration that welfare reform was a
success. But, as was the case nationwide, this did not occur.29 The social
safety net was largely dismantled and families remained steeped in deep
poverty and ever more vulnerable to the vagaries of the low-wage labor
market.30
In addition, paralleling a nationwide trend, New York City saw
the founding and growth of a number of grassroots organizing groups
that took on various welfare reform issues. Chief among these were
Families United for Racial and Economic Equality, founded in 2000 by a
group of women on welfare to improve welfare recipients‟ access to
education,31 the Welfare Rights Initiative, founded in 1997 by a group of
women on welfare attending the City University of New York who work
to “inject the voices of students (especially those with firsthand
experience of poverty) into [welfare reform debates],”32 and Community
Voices Heard (“CVH”), “an organization of low-income people,
predominantly women . . . on welfare, working to build power in New
York City . . . to improve the lives of our families and communities.”33
These groups employed a variety of organizing and advocacy strategies
to bring attention to and combat welfare reform. These organizing tactics
were, in many cases, quite effective in bringing pressure to bear on the
27

See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes From a Law
School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 193-96 (2001) (discussing the lobbying campaign spear
headed by the Welfare Rights Initiative, a community based organizing group, and supported by a
CUNY Law School clinic to expand access to education and training through amendments to state
legislation and characterizing those changes as reclaiming ground lost as a result of welfare reform).
28
Sewell Chan, Welfare Rolls Falling Again, Amid Worries About Poverty, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2006, at B1. As of April 16, 2007, New York City‟s welfare dropped to a historic low of
368,444, a total decline of nearly 68% since 1995. Press Release, Office of Temporary and
Disability Assistance, New York State Welfare Rolls Continue to Decline (April 16, 2007),
http://www.dads.ny.gov/main/news/2007/2007-04-16.asp.
29
WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19 (discussing the rise in hunger
and homelessness that occurred in New York City); see also Juliet M. Brodie, Post-Welfare
Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty Law Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‟Y
201, 216 (2006) (discussing the often worsening economic circumstances of former welfare
recipients in the workforce due to increased expenses associated with work).
30
See, e.g., WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19, § II.A.1 (discussing
the rise in hunger and homelessness that occurred in New York City).
31
See Families United for Racial and Economic Equality, Who We Are,
http://www.furee.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
32
See Welfare Rights Initiative, Mission Statement, http://www.wri-ny.org (last visited
Sept. 27, 2008); see also Loffredo, supra note 27, at 190-91.
33
Community Voices Heard, Mission Statement, http://www.cvhaction.org (last visited
Sept. 27, 2008). CVH aims to accomplish its goals “through a multi-pronged strategy, including
public education, grass roots organizing, [and] leadership development .” Id.
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local administration around some of the worst aspects of welfare reform
and in adding to national efforts to combat welfare reform.34
2. The Advocacy Community Responds to Privatization
Directly
While the traditional litigation and lobbying advocacy efforts
affected privatization only indirectly, other advocacy efforts aimed
directly at privatization itself. Chief among early efforts to combat
privatization was a campaign to target ethical breaches in the city‟s first
wide-scale contracting efforts.35
In 1999, the Giuliani administration sought to let $500 million in
private entities contracts to provide welfare-to-work services.36 Almost
immediately, the administration‟s contractual bidding process embroiled
the administration in a scandal. The City Comptroller Alan Hevesi
investigated allegations that the administration violated fair bidding rules
by engaging in “wide-ranging discussions . . . on its „welfare reform
efforts‟” with officials at Maximus Inc., the eventual recipients of the
largest share of the contracts, five months prior to its first informational
meeting with other prospective bidders.37 The comptroller engaged in a
protracted but ultimately unsuccessful effort to stop the letting of the
Maximus contract.38
In addition, in 2004 and 2005, CVH began to research the
effectiveness of welfare-to-work contracts.39 The report the group issued
is one of the few pieces of qualitative research documenting the
problematic experience of welfare recipients in privatized service

34

Some of the most visible New York City organizing work from this time was
documented in A Day’s Work, A Day’s Pay, a documentary produced by Mint Leaf Productions:
[The documentary] follows three welfare recipients in New York City from 1997 to 2000
as they participate in the largest welfare-to-work program in the nation. When forced to
work at city jobs for well below the prevailing wage and deprived of the chance to go to
school, these individuals decide to fight back, demanding programs that will actually help
them move off of welfare and into jobs. It was broadcast nationwide on PBS and cable
throughout 2002 and 2003.
Mint Leaf Productions, A Day‟s Work, A Day‟s Pay, http://www.mintleafproductions.com/adw.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2008). Another highly visible and effective national campaign, Welfare Made a
Difference, was launched by the Community Food Resource Network. Caitlin Johnson, When
Welfare Works, CONNECT FOR KIDS, http://www.connectforkids.org/node/222 (last visited Sept. 27,
2008). “The mission of the . . . campaign [was] to document the experiences of parents who have
received welfare and collect their recommendations for improving the system.” Id.
35
See, e.g., Privatization in Practice: Human Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1435,
1446-51 (comments of Liz Krueger, former Associate Director of Community Food Resource
Center, describing her criticisms of various early contracting efforts by New York City).
36
WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19.
37
Nina Bernstein, Company Had Head Start Preparing Bid in Welfare-to-Work
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at B6.
38
See WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19.
39
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 17.
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environments.40 The report provides essential data on how privatization
harms poor communities, augments and legitimates an organizing
campaign to improve welfare policy, and offers an effective model of
advocacy to address the harms of privatization. As described more fully
in Part IV, CVH‟s work and methodology can be incorporated into
public law mechanisms to create accountability in the contracting
process.
3. Privatization Outcomes: A Program That Failed to Move
People from Welfare to Work
CVH‟s report documented the extraordinary overall failure of
New York City‟s first large-scale privatization effort. In the report,
entitled The Revolving Door: Research Findings on NYC’s Employment
Services and Placement System and Its Effectiveness in Moving People
from Welfare to Work (“The Revolving Door”), CVH studied the
effectiveness of contracts between the City of New York and private
vendors to provide welfare-to-work services.41 The researchers took New
York City at its word that the main goal of the program was to move
people from welfare to work and “set out to uncover whether or not
currently operating job readiness and job placement programs
accomplish their intended goals, what stands in their way, and how they
might be improved to better serve the needs of the clients, the providers,
and the system at large.”42 With very few exceptions, CVH revealed a
system that was almost completely failing to meet its stated goals.
The contracts were entirely performance-based, meaning that
vendors were paid only when a client reached a particular outcome.43 At
40

But see Frank Munger, Dependency by Law: Poverty, Identity, and Welfare
Privatization, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391 (2006). Relying on extensive focus group
interviews with welfare recipients and other actors in the social welfare system in Buffalo, New
York, Professor Munger provides a fascinating account of the effects of privatization and other
aspects of welfare reform on the self-perception of women receiving welfare. Id. at 392.
41
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 2. The program under study in THE
REVOLVING DOOR was New York City‟s Employment Services and Placement (ESP) program. Id.
This program was designed to serve approximately 27,000 clients per year from the city at a cost of
approximately $43,000,000 per year. Id. at 28. Individuals participated for 35 hours per week for a
maximum of six months. Id. at 29. For the first two weeks of the program, they spent all their time
with the private vendor, engaging in assessment, job readiness, and job search activities. Id. After
two weeks they spent two full days a week at the vendor‟s site and three days a week working in a
work experience placement at another site. Id. The goal of the program, according to city documents,
was to “assist all non-exempt” applicants and participants to achieve self-reliance through paid
employment. Id. at 27.
42
Id. at 13. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the program, CVH analyzed
documents from the city agency obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, performed a
random survey of 600 clients, interviewed staff from all but one of the vendors, and conducted
twelve in-depth client interviews. Id. at 17-18.
43
Id. at 27. The total reliance on performance-based incentives in these contracts made
them unusual. “In 2001, only 20 percent of all [TANF] contracts were incentive-based in any way.”
Id. (citing SANGER, supra note 7, at 20). The privatized vendors were representative of the wide
range of private entities in the field. Included were large, multi-national, and national corporations
such as Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. and America Works, fairly large non-profits such as
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the start of the contracts, the city projected that, of the individuals who
enrolled in the program, 46% would be placed, 35% would retain jobs
for three months, and 25% would retain them for six months.44 The
actual outcomes, however, were far less impressive. Of the average of
4144 people who were referred into the system each month, only 8%, or
346, were placed in employment, and of those, 43% (149 individuals)
still had their jobs at three months, and 35% (121 individuals) had their
jobs after six months.45 The program referred clients to jobs that offered
low salaries, little stability and very little chance of leading the families
out of poverty. Seventy-five percent of those with Employment Services
and Placement (“ESP”) vendor-referred jobs earned $8.00 per hour or
less, 19% were referred to part-time positions, and many of the full-time
positions were temporary.46 Moreover, of those placed in jobs who
earned enough to close their welfare cases, 29% returned to public
assistance within six months and 36% remained unaccounted for.47
Given the low placement and retention figures, CVH focused
significant portions of the report on documenting what happened to the
92% of the population who were not placed and the structures that led to
these breakdowns.48 The program punished, through a reduction of
already meager benefits,49 a disturbingly high number of individuals for
Federation Employment Guidance Service, Inc., Goodwill Industries, and Wildcat Service
Corporation, and New York City based non-profit entities such as the Non-Profit Assistance
Corporation. See id. at 28, 33. The organizations used a wide variety of programs and tactics to
provide services but were all operating under the same incentive-based contract terms. Vendors
received 25% percent of the maximum per client payment at job placement, 45% if the person
retained the job after three months, and the remainder if the person retained the job for six months.
Id. at 27. The vendor could also receive some bonus payments for placement in “high wage” jobs or
jobs that led to a closure of the welfare case. Id.
44
Id. at 28.
45
Id. at 32. Interestingly, after the report was released, the major dispute between CVH
and the city agency had to do with how placement and retention figures should be calculated. CVH
insisted that the system as a whole be held accountable not only for those who enroll but for those
who are referred. Email from Sondra Youdelman, CVH, to Wendy A. Bach, CUNY Law School
(Nov. 8, 2008, 12:12:17 PM EST) (on file with author). Thus CVH‟s calculation leaves all referred
individuals in the denominator, thus reducing the percentages of “success.” CVH‟s position was,
rightly, that, given that the city advertised the program as one designed to assist clients, if clients
choose not to participate in a program, that too is a sign of failure on the program‟s part. However,
even if one accepts the city‟s position and calculates the numbers counting only those who enrolled
in the program, the statistics do not improve significantly: only an average of 15% of those who
enroll are placed in jobs by the end of six months in contrast to the 25% projected by the city. In
addition, this calculation dispute does not affect CVH‟s findings as to the nature of the jobs held by
those who actually obtained employment. THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 33, 35-36.
46
Id. at 35.
47
Id. at 39.
48
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 77-92.
49
Under New York State Law, when an individual fails or refuses without good cause to
comply with work program requirements, their pro rata share of the budget is reduced for some
period of time. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 342 (McKinney 1997). The length of sanction varies
based on the number of previous sanctions in the household‟s record and the composition of the
family. Id. § 342.2-.3 For example, for the mother of two children who “fails to comply” a second
time, her regular grant of $691 is reduced by one-third for a minimum of three months. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R & REGS. tit. 18, § 385.12(d) (2008). At any one time an average of approximately 25% of
the overall caseload is either in the pipeline to be sanctioned or is actually sanctioned. For the current

286

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

some failure to comply with rules.50 Of all those referred each month,
76% of the population (on average 3149 people) fell into this category,
either because they did not attend the program at the start (30% of the
full population) or because the agency concluded that they had failed to
comply with some program rule later in the process (46% of the full
population).51 This dramatic contrast between the 121 people in jobs after
six months and the over 3000 people punished monthly in the system
represented, in CVH‟s estimation, an utterly failed system.52 Despite
these clear failures, when the city redesigned and rebid the contracts in
2006, the contract incentives were modified only slightly,53 and the same
vendors that had run the ESP program received new contracts.54
These two pieces of data, first that the overwhelming majority of
recipients ended up sanctioned instead of employed, and second that,
despite this failure, the contracts were re-let to the same vendors on
similar terms, suggest something quite disturbing. As noted above,
welfare reform has been deemed a success in large part because of the
radical reductions in caseload. However, those reductions have not been
accompanied by a similar advancement of welfare recipients in the labor
market. The ESP program, although promoted as one designed to move
people into the labor force, appears significantly more successful at
punishment than at placement. Given the agency‟s apparent endorsement
of these outcomes through the re-letting of contracts to the same vendors,
it is fair to speculate that these devastating outcomes were endorsed by

work participation status of the New York City caseload, see HUMAN RES. ADMIN., CITY OF N.Y.,
DEP‟T OF SOC. SERVS., WEEKLY CASELOAD ENGAGEMENT STATUS (2008), http://www.nyc.gov/
html/hra/downloads/pdf/citywide.pdf. This document regularly provides data on the proportion of
the caseload in various statuses including those in the sanction process or with a sanction in effect.
The statistics posted from the week of October 12, 2008 listed 24.2% of cases as in the sanction
process (10.3%) or with a sanction in effect (13.9%). Id.
50
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 77.
51
See id. The complete outcome data was as follows: 8% placed; 30% sanctioned for
failure to appear; 14% sent back to the agency because of an inappropriate referral; 46% sanctioned
for failure to comply with a program rule; and 2% still active in the program. Id. at 78.
52
Id. at 32, 93.
53
The payment milestones under the Back to Work Program were as follows: contractors
could be paid a maximum of $5,000 per participant; 10% is paid upon completion of an assessment
and employment plan (a new aspect of the contracts); 30% is paid upon placement in unsubsidized
employment for thirty days at a minimum of twenty hours per week; 10% is paid if the placement is
of a “time limited” or for a sanctioned individual; 2% is paid if the placement results in a case
closure; 25% is paid for retention at 180 days; and an additional 3% is paid if the individual shows a
10% wage gain from initial placement. The contracts also provide additional incentive payments for
vendors that increase the rate of sanction case removal, increase positive administrative indicators,
and increase the federal work participation rate. See Contract Between the City of New York and
America Works of New York, May 2, 2006 (on file with author); see also ALEXA KASDEN WITH
SONDRA YOUDELMAN, MISSING THE MARK: AN EXAMINATION OF NYC‟S BACK TO WORK
PROGRAM AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN MEETING EMPLOYMENT GOALS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS 79
(2008) [hereinafter MISSING THE MARK], available at http://cvh.mayfirst.org/files/Missing%20the%20
Mark%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf.
54
See COMMUNITY VOICES HEARD, HRA BACK TO WORK SUPPORT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE/TRAINING, MONITORING/ASSESSMENT, AND
EVALUATION (2007), http://www.cvhaction.org/node/160#attachments.
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the agency letting the contract.55 For the purposes of this Article, the
question becomes how these outcomes were effectuated.
4. Privatization Incentives: The Motivating Forces Behind
Failure
CVH‟s report not only documented the failures of the ESP
system but identified the systemic problems that led to these outcomes.
Its criticisms were wide-ranging. CVH noted problems that predicted
failure, including the lack of experienced job developers and inadequate
curriculum for job skills training.56 For the purposes of this Article,
however, the most interesting critiques focused on how both the formal
contract terms, and the formal and informal contract performance
monitoring, failed to create meaningful employment.57 In particular, the
report criticized the lack of access to education and training and the
contractual disincentives to providing services to clients whose path to
work would be challenging.58
Despite a legal entitlement to having one‟s preference for
education or training honored under many circumstances59 and a desire,
by 71% of the clients, to attend education or training,60 CVH found that
one in three clients “did not know that education and training might
satisfy a portion of their work requirements”61 and only 18% of ESP
participants attended such programs.62 CVH reported that the structure of
the contract payment system led to a failure to provide education and
training.63 Quite simply, the contracts created no real incentive to place
55

In addition, although the specific reasons for the re-letting of the contracts were not
clear, it is likely that the agency was subject, to a certain degree, to capture by the agencies that held
the ESP contracts. This means that even if real competition existed at the beginning of the ESP
program, by the time the new requests for proposals were issued, there were very few other vendors
who were able to credibly bid for the contracts. This phenomena and its possible impact provide
support for arguments that privatization through contracting is problematic because it strips the
government of the ability to control programs over time. See infra note 100. That the ESP program
was designed more as a caseload reduction mechanism than as a real means to helping recipients
find work is confirmed by the statement of Nancy Biberman, the Executive Director of WHEDCO, a
New York City non-profit that received an ESP contract:
The ESP program and contracts were never intended to result in viable jobs for welfare
recipients. The rapid reduction of the welfare caseload was the public policy mandate out
of which the ESP program was created. . . . The contracts were structured to provide
financial incentives for “rapid labor market attachment” (the expressly stated goal of
HRA commissioner Jason Turner). Consequently at best they provided quick job
placements and woefully unsatisfactory job retention outcomes.
SANGER, supra note 7, at 56.
56
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 4-5, 45.
57
Id. at 69-71.
58
Id.
59
See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 335 (McKinney 1997).
60
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 64.
61
Id. at 53
62
Id.
63
Id. at 69-71.
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people in education and training as vendors, paid only for placement and
retention, focused their efforts on placement as the most likely strategy to
improve their rates.64 These performance incentives led the vendors to
“cream,” selecting out and serving those who were easier to serve, and
avoiding serving those with greater needs:65
Many providers felt frustrated that the fully performance-based structure
of the contracts, defining performance solely in reference to the final outcome
of job placement and not the steps necessary to reach that outcome, put them in
a bind. They did, at times, need to focus on the individuals that were most
likely to be placed quickly, and overlook those that needed more support to
reach that stage. Such a financial assessment forced vendors from time to time
to compromise their ethics . . . . Vendors that would normally want to prioritize
education and training for clients . . . are forced to merely focus on job
placement for cash flow purposes.66

Equally disturbing were the incentives created by the contract to divert
those who were harder to serve by finding a means to punish them for
non-compliance instead of serving them. CVH reported that the vendors
were “discouraged from working with clients for the long amount of time
often necessary to address barriers and are instead encouraged to
sanction them.”67 Furthermore, “[t]he incentives are structured in a way
that encourages vendors to work with those easiest to place quickly, and
leave behind those that need more support and more time for initial
placement. Clients realize this and grow wary of a system that is failing
to meet their needs.”68
64
Id. at 70. Although the contractual focus on retention would seem to push vendors to
give participants access to education and training to promote hiring into more stable employment,
this apparently did not occur. Instead, given the difficulty in meeting the retention goals, vendors
reported to CVH that they focused efforts on upping their numbers of initial placements as a way to
ensure a steady cash flow. See id.
65
Although the CVH study is one of the few to document the creaming phenomenon, it
has long been the fear of critics who oppose using performance-based contracts in the welfare area.
See, e.g., LaDonna Pavetti et al., Changing the Culture of the Welfare Office: The Role of
Intermediaries in Linking TANF Recipients with Jobs, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL‟Y REV.,
Sept. 2001, at 63, 68. For an extensive discussion of these and other phenomena in the contracting
out of welfare services, see SANGER, supra note 7, at 16-21. In addition to the clear contract
incentives to serve only those easiest to serve, there are greater institutional pressures on
employment agencies to avoid serving those who are hardest to serve. As Joel Handler has aptly
observed:

State employment services compete with private services in presenting themselves as
reliable sources of qualified labor to private employers. Sadly, it is not in their interests to
devote a great deal of resources to those welfare recipients who could benefit the most
from work experience and training. . . . The strategy will be to satisfy the minimum
funding requirements and somehow deflect the hard cases. Difficult clients (that is,
clients with lots of problems) will somehow be excused or dropped from programs
instead of receiving extra help and encouragement.
HANDLER, supra note 5, at 28.
66
THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 70.
67
Id. at 8.
68
Id.
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Not only did the performance incentives, on their face,
discourage vendors from working with those clients requiring additional
services, but vendors reported that, in the informal monitoring processes,
they were regularly encouraged by the city agency to sanction clients. In
the words of one vendor addressing the failures of the ESP system:
Why continue to send people to the same program if it‟s not working? . . . HRA
tells us to [sanction them for failing to comply], but why? They are just sent to
another ESP Site. We‟re known for keeping people on our roster for too long.
But, if we [sanction] everyone, we wouldn‟t have anyone. The whole system is
a recycling process.69

At this point several things should be clear. First, from an
outcome perspective, privatization failed to move people from welfare to
work, and the vast majority of clients ended up punished instead of
helped. Second, the city‟s renewal of contracts with the same vendors
and with only minor modifications of the contract terms appeared to
endorse these outcomes.70 Third, from an administrative law perspective,
the motivating force governing the interaction between the welfare
recipient and the “welfare worker” had radically shifted. In a traditional
administrative law setting, the behavior of the government-employed
welfare worker is motivated, at least in theory, by the mandates
contained in law, regulation, and sub-regulatory materials.
CVH‟s report provides support for the hypothesis that the
vendor‟s behavior is governed in large part by contract terms and not
primarily by the substantive statute or regulation governing the welfare
program. Even beyond this, performance under the contract is motivated
not only by those formal contract incentives but by informal monitoring
mechanisms. When the city agency pushed vendors to sanction clients
rather than give them services, this dynamic became clear.
Although CVH was able, through fairly extraordinary efforts,71
to uncover this data and write a detailed and critical report, the contract

69

Id. at 7 (quoting an ESP provider).
In many ways the data CVH uncovered was not surprising when viewed in a national
context. Researchers have long observed that performance-based contracts in the welfare arena
would create incentives to reduce services and push recipients off of the welfare rolls. For example,
in probably the most celebrated use of private contractors in welfare reform, contractors in the W-2
program in Wisconsin were permitted to keep a portion of unspent contract funds, and, in certain
circumstances, to keep benefits that they withheld from recipients as a result of case sanctions, thus
creating enormous incentives to withhold benefits and services. Karyn Rotker, Jane Ahlstrom &
Fran Bernstein, Wisconsin Works—For Private Contractors, That Is, 35 J. POVERTY L. & POL‟Y
530, 533 (2002). For a more in depth discussion of the way that corporations are given incentives to
maximize profits through denying or reducing benefits and services, see Kennedy, supra note 4, at
301-02.
71
CVH relied both on its own capacity to collect data and, to some extent, on the initial
naiveté of the administration. When CVH sought to reproduce its methodology in a subsequent
report, it encountered substantially more resistance and ultimately did not prevail in getting
anywhere near the robust data that it did for the ESP report. FAILURE TO COMPLY, supra note 23,
at 10.
70
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terms and contract monitoring structures that led to these outcomes were
created with little or no public scrutiny.72
Privatization, at least in this context, was thus an extraordinarily
effective mechanism to design and implement, without any public input
or initial scrutiny, a program that would impose highly punitive welfare
policies. This lack of public input is precisely the problem that this
Article seeks to address. The central question, then, is whether either
administrative law or the market currently offers an effective mechanism
for public participation in this new form of administrative governance or
whether new administrative law structures must be designed to respond
more effectively to this lack of transparency and accountability. Part II
turns to the first of these questions.
II.

THE FEASIBILITY OF RELYING ON TRADITIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY STRUCTURES OR THE MARKET
TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF PRIVATIZATION

Traditional administrative law offers a variety of tools designed
to ensure that when the government formulates policies, it is accountable
to the public and adheres to fundamental democratic norms.73 Chief
among these structures are freedom of information and sunshine laws,
laws requiring that the government provide notice of administrative
rulemaking and an opportunity for the public to comment prior to final
promulgation of rules, and mechanisms for members of the public to sue
if an administrative agency acts outside the boundaries of its statutory
mandate.74
Each of these bodies of law creates opportunities for democratic
participation in a privatized context. However, participation by the
private entity significantly complicates the analysis and renders exclusive
reliance on these structures difficult, if not impossible.75 In addition,
public law also offers a variety of mechanisms designed to ensure the
fairness of government contracting processes. Chief among these are
72

The contracts were let through traditional public contracting procedures, a process that
leaves virtually no room for public input into the substantive terms of the contract. See infra Part II.
73
See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 23-40
(4th ed. 2004).
74
The Sunshine Act was passed because “the public is entitled to the fullest practicable
information regarding the decisionmaking processes of the Federal Government.” Sunshine Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976). The Act requires that most meetings with agency
members be open to the public and prohibits ex parte communications in formal adjudications or
hearings. Id. §§ 3-4; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) (“General notice of proposed rule making
shall be published . . . .”); id. § 553(c) (“[An] agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making . . . .”).
75
For additional discussion of the erosion of traditional administrative law norms raised
by the contracting of government functions to public entities and the critiques leveled at privatization
as a result of that erosion, see Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1301-10 (2003); Freeman, supra note 15, at 176. For an even more general
discussion of public law concerns raised by various forms of privatization, see Minow, supra note 3,
at 1246-55.
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regulations governing procurement processes.76 Finally, inherent in the
move toward privatization is a suggestion that the market itself will stand
in the place of regulatory structures to create good policy. In the
following Part, I briefly review the feasibility of using both sets of
administrative law structures as well as the market itself to increase
accountability. In Part IV, I will argue that a substantial reworking of
elements of all these structures that takes into account both the realities
of public contracting and the power differentials inherent in provision of
social welfare services offers some potential to increase the
accountability of this system.
A.

The Feasibility of Relying on Traditional Administrative Law
Mechanisms Designed to Create Accountability in
Administrative Rulemaking and Operations

As a conceptual matter, freedom of information, sunshine, and
notice and comment laws are predicated on a traditional conception of
administrative law: the administrative agency is created and governed by
statutory enabling legislation, and creates and implements rules that
govern its interactions with the public.77 To check what would otherwise
be inappropriate power, the agency is subject to a variety of mechanisms
designed to render the conduct of the agency more democratic.78
Meetings of the government body are, in theory, subject to sunshine
laws, allowing the public to view the formal workings of this process.79
Freedom of information laws allow the public to obtain some access to
documents produced by the government, again subjecting the agency to
public scrutiny and therefore enhancing democratic accountability.80
Notice and comment laws provide an informal rulemaking process in
which members of the public participate in the promulgation of
regulations that govern the way the agency interacts with the public.81
Finally, actions predicated on claims that an administrative agency
exceeded its statutory mandates confine the ability of the government
agency to wholly circumvent the democratic checks inherent in the
passage of laws by publicly elected legislative bodies.82
As an initial matter, each of these tools presumes that a
government agency is the primary actor. If the government is not the
76

See Natalie Gomez-Velez, Proactive Procurement: Using New York City’s
Procurement Rules to Foster Positive Human Services Policies and Serve Public Goals, 9 N.Y. CITY
L. REV. 331, 352-53 (2006).
77
See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 16.1 (2d ed. 2001).
78
For a general discussion of the statutory and judicial checks on administrative actions,
see PIERCE ET AL., supra note 73, at 79-226.
79
Id. at 497-98.
80
Id. at 431-73.
81
Id. at 327-43.
82
Id. at 364-408.
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actor, it is far from clear whether any of these laws apply, leaving some
doubt as to the efficacy of a litigation strategy for addressing the
concerns I raise in this Article. For example, the relevant provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and
the Sunshine Act apply, with some exceptions not relevant to this
discussion, to “agencies” defined as “each authority of the Government
of the United States.”83 Thus, initially it appears, for example, that
documents produced by an entity under contract with the government to
provide welfare services may not be available under freedom of
information laws.84 Under the same doctrine, sunshine laws may not
allow one to view meetings being held by entities under contract with the
government.
Beyond the problems raised by the applicability of the relevant
administrative law tools to a restrictive conception of what is a
“government agency” or what is “state action;”85 however, is a
fundamental distinction in administrative law, between quasi-legislative
functions of administrative agencies on the one hand and all other
functions on the other.86 Administrative law accountability tools of the
kind I have discussed arose, fundamentally, from a concern that the
administrative state functions without the checks and balances inherent
in the other branches of government. The fear, embodied in some
conceptions of this branch of administrative law, is that the
administrative state is in effect an unelected legislative body, able to

83

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C § 551(1) (2006). For a detailed discussion of
the significance of this restriction, see Alfred D. Aman, Proposals for Reforming the Administrative
Procedure Act: Globalization, Democracy and the Furtherance of a Global Public Interest, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 397, 415-16 (1999).
84
For example, although CVH was able to procure data given by the vendors to the
administrative agency through the state Freedom of Information Law, it is not at all clear under New
York Law that they could have gotten any data directly from the vendors. See, e.g., Ervin v. S. Tier
Econ. Dev., Inc., 809 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270 (App. Div. 2006) (finding a non-profit development
corporation was not an agency where its board was comprised of private individuals, it was not
subject to control by municipality of corporation, it did not make public the audits of its financial
records, it did not hold itself out as an agent of the municipality, and it did not disburse funds on
behalf of municipality); Farms First v. Saratoga Econ. Dev. Corp., 635 N.Y.S.2d 720, 720-21 (App.
Div. 1995) (finding a non-profit corporation not subjected to Freedom of Information Law even
though it received over 50% of its revenues from the county, where it simply contracted with the
county on a fee-for-service basis). But cf. Buffalo News, Inc. v. Buffalo Enter. Dev. Corp., 619
N.E.2d 695, 696-98 (N.Y. 1994) (non-profit local development corporation considered an “agency”
for FOIL purposes as it was “created exclusively by and for [municipality],” “required to publicly
disclose its annual budget,” held itself out as an “agent” of municipality, “channel[ed] public funds
into the community,” and had board members who were public officials, held offices in public
buildings, and enjoyed many attributes of public entities).
85
For a particularly compelling reconceptualization of state action doctrine, see Daphne
Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1995).
86
See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 73, at 282 (describing informal rulemaking as creating
procedures that “closely resemble the process of enacting legislation” and noting that “[the agency]
can act through . . . issuing a notice of its intent to act, providing an opportunity for individuals and
groups to comment in writing on its proposed action, and accompanying its final action with a
statement of basis and purpose”).
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impose its will on the public without any form of accountability.87 As a
result, when an administrative agency acts more like a legislature, for
example, promulgating a welfare regulation governing employment rules
or eligibility standards, it is acting in its quasi-legislative function.88
Notice and comment and procedural mechanisms, which allow parties to
litigate against the agency if it promulgates a rule in excess of its
statutory authority, are applicable to those processes precisely because in
theory these processes, if unchecked, lack sufficient limitations on the
power of the administrative agency. But when the government is not
acting in a “quasi legislative” function, these protections do not exist.
In the context of trying to create accountability in a privatized
sector of government programs, this matters because government
contracting is traditionally placed in the non-legislative category. A
prime example is the exclusion of government contracting from the
notice and comment provision of the Administrative Procedure Act.89
The theory behind this and similar exclusions is that when the
government is procuring services, for example, to build a road, it is
acting more like any other actor in the marketplace and less like a
legislature. This may make sense when applied to building a road or
entering into a contract to procure office supplies for a government
agency, but it makes significantly less sense when the government is
procuring human services.90
Returning to how the formal contract terms and the informal
contract mechanisms discussed above motivated the interactions between
private vendors and welfare recipients, and the likely applicability of
these findings to a wide variety of privatized contexts, it is clear that the
contracts themselves, as well as the informal contract monitoring
functions, should be recategorized from a non-quasi legislative function
into a quasi legislative function.91 This would subject them to traditional
administrative law mechanisms. Thus, at least one potential “solution” to
the problem described above is to subject contracts to notice and
comment rulemaking. However, as Alfred Aman has noted, and as the
CVH study indicates, because informal contract monitoring mechanisms
play such a significant role in actual contractor behavior, merely
subjecting contracts themselves to notice and comment will not fully
address the problem. As Aman discusses it,

87

See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462, 503 (2003).
88
As a general matter, under the Administrative Procedure Act, “[a]ny rule that has a
significant, binding effect on the substantive rights of parties will be characterized as a legislative
rule” and will be subject to the rule-making procedures in the APA. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 73,
at 322.
89
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2006).
90
See Gomez-Velez, supra note 76, at 353.
91
See Aman, supra note 83, at 417.
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Even if the details [of the contract] are noticed, its day-to-day implementation
may not be visible to the public. . . . [S]uch an approach assumes a distinction
between administration and policymaking that does not exist in reality. The
process of administration inevitably involves policymaking, especially when
emergencies or unusual circumstances arise. Thus, noticing the full details of a
proposed contract with a private provider should be a minimum requirement of
the privatizing process, but these contracts themselves may need to be subject
to frequent review.92

Therefore, there is a case to be made that tools such as freedom of
information and sunshine laws, notice and comment requirements, and
the state action doctrine must be expanded to include the conduct of
private entities. These strategies offer potential avenues for increasing
accountability and must be pursued by scholars and advocates in the
field. However, as argued in Part III, without taking into account both the
radically changed nature of governance in many sectors and issues of
disproportionate power, strategies such as these may ultimately fail to
significantly enhance accountability on their own.93
Another body of public law that provides some possibilities for
public participation is the law governing public procurement processes.
However, this body of law focuses almost exclusively “on ensuring low
price, fairness to vendors and the avoidance of corruption.”94
Procurement mechanisms, traditionally designed for contexts involving
the delivery of tangible good and services, “[m]ay be too limited to
address the much more substantial issues that arise when government
contracts out social services and traditionally governmental functions.”95
Nevertheless, as Professor Natalie Gomez-Velez has pointed out, and as
the wide-scale use of contracting in traditional government-run programs
suggests, examination and alteration of procurement policies to “improve
the quality of human services provided though . . . contracts” can lead to
improved procurement policies.96 In Part IV of this Article, I suggest
ways that administrative law concepts can be imported into the
procurement process to meet these ends.

92

Id. at 417 (citation omitted).
For additional discussion of the problems of importing traditional public law
mechanisms, wholesale and without modification, to a private context, see, e.g., id. at 417; see also
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574-93 (2000).
94
Gomez-Velez, supra note 76, at 332-33.
95
Freeman, supra note 15, at 165.
96
Gomez-Velez, supra note 76, at 333. In an extensive study of procurement reforms in
New York City, Gomez-Velez suggests that, in incorporating more mechanisms to address the
substance and quality of contracts for human services, procurement policies are changing to
accommodate values associated with the quality of government services. Id. at 352-53. GomezVelez posits this change as part of what Jody Freeman has termed “publicization,” the incorporation
of public law values into formerly private settings as a means of ensuring continued adherence to
Constitutional and public law values in the face of privatization. See Freeman, supra note 75, at
1301-10. This term also aptly describes the project of this Article.
93
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The Feasibility of Relying on the Market

Proponents of privatization posit the market itself as the means
to creating effective welfare programs.97 The previous subsections
examined traditional administrative law tools with an eye to whether they
successfully created accountability to poor communities in a contractedout welfare setting. The same question applies here: Does the market
itself, absent any public law intervention, offer a structure of
accountability to the poor clients of the welfare system? Will competition
inherent in market-based structures lead to increased innovation and
efficiency and ultimately to programs that are “better” in the eyes of
those served by the programs?
In a market model, a hypothetical consumer chooses one product
over another, drawing resources to the better product and leading to the
improved outcomes and efficiencies that the market model promises.98
Here, given the structure of welfare programs, it is faulty to assume that
the consumer role is played by the welfare applicant or recipient. Welfare
recipients do not choose the program to which they are assigned. Instead,
in New York City, as is no doubt the case in many jurisdictions, they are
assigned by the agency on a random basis.99 As it is certainly not the
welfare recipient who is making choices in the market, resources are not
drawn to one vendor or another based on the preferences of the
“consumer.” When one conceives of the consumer not as the welfare
recipient, but instead as the government, who is measuring performance
based on milestones they have set, the model makes a bit more sense.100
97
Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1743-49 (2002).
98
Id. at 1743.
99
MISSING THE MARK, supra note 53, at 3.
100
This Article assumes, based on CVH‟s data, as well as on a long history of social
welfare policy being used as a tool of subordination, discussed in Part III, that the government is
likely, if not subject to substantial outside pressure, to create policies that do not advance the needs
of poor communities. Although a full discussion of market failures in the more traditional senses is
beyond the scope of this Article, there are at least two fundamental market failures that can lead to
inefficiencies. First, for a variety of reasons, it is difficult to maintain sufficient competition for
contracts to lead to optimal market results. What tends to happen, instead, is that even if a significant
number of entities initially compete for a particular contract, over time vendors tend to become
established as the providers for a particular program. SANGER, supra note 7, at 19. For an egregious
example of the way in which competition can be eliminated in a privatized welfare context, see
Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare State, supra note 4, at 261-62. Kennedy describes the
attempted buy out by Citibank EBT Services of Transactive which, if successful, would have given
Citibank monopoly control over electronic benefits transfer systems in thirty-three states. Id. Second,
because government has turned over the running of the program to a private entity, the capacity of
the government to run the program without the vendor decreases. See, e.g., Privatization in Practice:
Human Services, supra note 35, at 1450-51. As a result of these parallel trends, the vendors begin to
have monopoly control over the program and the government becomes captive to the vendors. Under
any analysis, this does not lead to efficient markets. For an extensive discussion of these and other
phenomena in the contracting out of welfare services, see SANGER, supra note 7, at 16-21. In
addition, government typically has difficulty building sufficient expertise to monitor vendor
performance. As M. Bryna Sanger has noted, “[g]rowth in contracting must be accompanied by an
equal growth in government‟s ability to manage and monitor contractor behavior, but there are
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But from the perspective of accountability to poor communities, the ESP
program data clearly indicates that the government does not stand in the
shoes of program clients in choosing where to direct resources. In the
ESP program, 92% of the population were not placed and 76% were
punished.101 Despite these dismal outcomes, the contracts were renewed
with very few changes to the incentive payment structure.102 Had welfare
recipients done the choosing, it is difficult to imagine that the program
would have received such an endorsement. In fact, if one allows CVH to
speak for the community, it is quite clear that welfare recipients
considered the program a failure and would have reconfigured it much
more substantially.103
This accountability failure is not surprising. As Martha Minow
aptly observes,
With social services, including welfare-to-work transition assistance, . . .
accountability becomes especially important but also recalcitrant, because those
most directly affected by the services or failures to provide services are
politically and economically ineffectual. Treatment of vulnerable populations
simply does not work well in markets that depend upon consumer rationality or
upon political processes that demand active citizen monitoring.104

Given the lack of an active consumer whose interests are aligned
with poor communities, it seems that the market offers fewer rather than
more opportunities to create accountability. Matthew Diller has
indications that these developments do not necessarily coincide.” Id. at 16; see also Freeman, supra
note 15, at 171-72. So, even assuming good intentions on the part of government actors, there are
substantial reasons to suspect the ability of the market to lead to “good” outcomes.
101
See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
102
Compare note 43 (detailing the contract payment structure in the ESP contract), with
note 53 (detailing the contract payment structure in the Back to Work program). The Back to Work
program differed from the ESP program in that it combined within it the services originally provided
under ESP with assessment and employment planning services previously provided under a different
set of contracts during the time that ESP was in effect. MISSING THE MARK, supra note 53, at 23-24.
Thus, the contracts included incentive payments totaling 10% for provision of those services.
However, the incentives connected to the provision of employment services changed only slightly,
by placing some more emphasis on very short term retention (thirty days) and some targeting of
services to special populations (those under welfare time limits or sanctions). For example, under
ESP the vendors received 25% at placement, 45% at three month retention, and 25% at six months
with a high wage bonus, whereas under Back to Work the placement and retention payments were
30% at 30 day placement, 30% at 90 day retention, and 25% at 180 day retention. Id. at 79; supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
103
See supra Part I.B.3.
104
Minow, supra note 3, at 1262. The unsuitability of the market to create accountability
in a setting such as the contracting out of welfare has also been noted by Alfred Aman:
Too often . . . the politics of privatization and the market populism that is often a
dominant part of the political rhetoric that comes into play make it seem as if the
privatization of prisons or the determination of welfare eligibility were similar to the
regulation of airlines or cable television. The transparency that comes with consumers or
customers voting with their feet, as it were, is not likely to materialize in the context of
such privatized governmental services without processes designed to provide the kind of
information that can empower citizens and make their participation meaningful.
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets
More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477, 1496 (2001).
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persuasively argued that while welfare‟s move to privatization has been
characterized by its proponents as technocratic—seeking increased
efficiency and innovation—this explanation is insufficient and deceptive.
Diller instead views privatization as a means to obscure the making of
welfare policy from public scrutiny.105 As he observes,
One of the consequences of the technocratic basis of privatization in welfare is
that critical policy decisions are made in obscure ways. The actual content of
programs is determined through contract provisions governing performance
measurement, governmental oversight and financial incentive structures. All of
these features are generally hidden from public view by their sheer technical
complexity. To make matters worse, the process of drafting and negotiating the
critically important contractual terms is largely closed to public input.106

In New York City, the imposition of policies that harm rather
than help poor communities was being obscured through the use of
contracting. In fact, the ESP case study provides substantial evidence to
suggest that this is in fact precisely the role of privatization of this
program. In this instance, privatization created a situation where
extraordinarily punitive policies were imposed on welfare recipients
through the use of contracting.107 Ironically, the study also suggests that
under a market model, rather than functioning inefficiently as suggested
by many scholars,108 the system actually functions extraordinarily well in
rendering the poor of New York City tremendously vulnerable to the
vagaries of the low wage labor market and doing so without any real
accountability to either the public or the affected communities.109
105

Diller, supra note 97, at 1757.
Id. In some senses, privatization can be seen as taking the process by which power is
granted to local government to administer welfare programs even further and in a way that entirely
undermines any apparent positive benefit to the recipient. For an extensive discussion of this
phenomenon prior to 1996, see HANDLER, supra note 5, at 42-49.
107
Hearing Series on Welfare Reform, Work Requirements on the TANF Cash Welfare
Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Steve Savner, Senior Staff Att‟y, Center for Law and
Social Policy). This data raises even more concerns when one looks at both outcome and service
provision data through the lens of race. Although CVH was not able to break down outcome data by
race, some national data suggests that both outcome and the quality of service provision vary along
race lines. Id. In Wisconsin in 1995 through 1996, “61 percent of the white families receiving
assistance left the caseload, compared to 36 percent of the African-American families.” Id. In
Illinois, leaver data from June 1997 to June 1999 revealed racial disparities in the reasons for case
closure. Id. In that period,
106

[a] total of 340,958 cases closed . . . , of which 102,423 were whites and 238,535 were
minorities. Fifty-four percent of minority cases, but only 39 percent of white cases,
closed because the recipient failed to comply with program rules. Though earned income
made 40 percent of white families ineligible for support, earned income made only 27
percent of minority families ineligible.
Id. In addition, various studies indicate better treatment of white recipients than African American
recipients in regard to positive encouragement and assistance in job search and provision of
supportive assistance such as transportation help. Id.
108
See supra note 100.
109
See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE 31 (2001). The disturbing “efficiency” of the market in imposing harsh penalties on

298

III.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

CREATING SOLUTIONS: CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS

Given the wide scope of contracting out of traditional
government welfare functions and the effect of that transformation on the
ability of communities to create accountability in program design and
implementation, new administrative law structures must be created to
advance these values. Part III details the conceptual underpinnings for
the creation of such administrative law structures while Part IV identifies
practical accountability structures that might serve these ends. These
conceptual underpinnings rely on three bodies of scholarship: “new
governance” theory, social science literature documenting the historical
subordination in social welfare programs, and community/rebellious
lawyering scholarship. To create accountability in privatized programs
traditionally characterized by subordination, new governance structures
provide a politically promising means of reform. However, given the
disproportionate power between government and welfare recipients and
the long history of the use of social welfare programs to subordinate poor
communities, these governance structures must be significantly reconceptualized. Community participation must be transformed from
mere tokenism into substantive participation by poor communities. In
addition, the insights of community/rebellious lawyering scholarship
argue for making the source of that participation grassroots organizing
groups.110
A.

The Administrative Law Framework Offered by New
Governance Scholarship

Although definitional frames and boundaries are hotly
contested,111 new governance scholars seek to build a conceptual bridge
between those administrative law scholars that advocate the
strengthening of New Deal-based centralized regulatory structures and
those scholars from the law and economics school that seek to rely on
market forces to create efficiency.112 Seeking a third way between these
poor communities is not surprising. As Katz notes, this kind of “market success” has been
manifested in a variety of privatized programs:
The women forced to claim public assistance in order to survive exert little if any
influence over the design of newly “marketized” welfare policies. The real exchange
links politicians and their constituencies. The commodity is votes, and the desired
outcome is reduced welfare rolls, regardless of what happens to those rejected for
benefits or terminated from assistance.
Id.
110

See infra Part IV.A.4.
See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in
the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473 (2004)
(responding to Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004)).
112
See generally, e.g., Freeman, supra note 93.
111
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two schools, scholars in this field describe a new paradigm, “a key
strength . . . [of which] is its explicit suggestion that economic efficiency
and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.”113 For the
purposes of this Article, this body of scholarship is particularly
compelling because it accepts the shift to market structures and theory
inherent in so much of current governance and attempts to impose
accountability in light of these shifts.
In seeking new administrative law paradigms, these scholars
describe movements away from both top-down regulation and
“deregulation” in the law and economics sense, and towards a
collaborative, “softer” model where a variety of stakeholders work
together to create, implement, and continually renegotiate programmatic
structure and implementation.114 This scholarship engages directly with
the newly configured modes of governance of which privatization is a
major component.
New governance frameworks put a premium on experimentation
and means of learning from experimentation. Fundamentally, they put far
less emphasis on centralized, expert decision-makers and “broaden[] the
decision-making playing field by involving more actors in the various
stages of the legal process. It also diversifies the types of expertise and
experience that these new actors bring to the table.”115
Among the key players included in this broadened set of
governing actors are third parties, non-government actors enlisted to
administer public functions, “such as the delivery of social services.
Sharing tasks and responsibilities with the private sector creates more
interdependence between government and the market. In turn, increased
participation leads to fluid and permeable boundaries between private
and public.”116
New governance structures are also, ideally, characterized by
increased collaboration. Individuals participating in the governance
scheme “are involved in the process of developing the norms of behavior
and changing them.”117 Individuals interact over time, share information
and responsibility, and continually renegotiate and reconfigure program
structures as their collective understanding evolves. “In a cooperative
regime, the role of government changes from regulator and controller to

113

Lobel, supra note 111, at 344.
See also Karkkainen, supra note 111, at 473 (describing new governance scholarship
as endeavoring “simultaneously to chronicle, interpret, analyze, theorize, and advocate a seismic
reorientation in both the public policymaking process and the tools employed in policy
implementation . . . generally away from the familiar model of command-style, fixed-rule regulation
by administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive,
problem-solving New Governance”).
115
Lobel, supra note 111, at 373.
116
Id. at 374.
117
Id. at 377.
114
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facilitator, and law becomes a shared problem-solving process rather
than an ordering activity.”118
New governance frameworks also reject the centralization and
standardization characterized by New Deal structures and instead
embrace localization, competition, solutions derived from the particular
needs and circumstances of those closest to the problem, solutions that
cross over traditional boundaries between areas of law, and a kind of
perpetual experimentation inherent in multiple, ongoing collaborations.119
Related to collaboration is a concept of heterogeneity of approaches and
continuous improvement as a result of this ability of multiple, often
private, actors to approach problems from multiple perspectives. New
governance structures are envisioned as inherently dynamic and
experimentalist in nature.120
Finally, a fundamental aspect of new governance frameworks is
the possibility of “orchestration.”121 Orchestration requires that
“decentralization . . . be coupled with regional and national commitments
to coordinate local efforts and communicate lessons in a comprehensive
manner.”122 In theory, orchestration allows the government to identify a
problem in need of solving and then “promote and standardize
innovations that began locally and privately. Scaling up, facilitating
innovation, standardizing good practices, and researching and replicating
success stories from local or private levels are central goals of
government.”123 In a very real sense, the power of the government in this
conception is the power of the purse.124 Government calls for and
supports innovation, evaluates proposals, and then encourages both best
practices and continued experimentation.
New governance frameworks offer a promising means of
creating accountability in contracted-out welfare programs for a variety
of reasons. First is the political feasibility of the project. As discussed in
Part I, privatization and large-scale collaborations between government
and private entities increasingly dominate welfare programs. 125 Theories
and strategies that question, slow, and alter this process are an essential
part of any comprehensive advocacy strategy to respond to
privatization.126 However, the dominance of privatization in the provision
of previously government-run welfare programs and the current welfare
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Id.
Id. at 379-86.
120
Id. at 396.
121
Id. at 400.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 400-01.
124
Freeman, supra note 75, at 1285.
125
See supra Parts I.A, I.B.1.
126
Several scholars have focused considerable attention on strategies and theories that
would slow privatization. See Freeman, supra note 93, at 574-93.
119
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program strategies require engagement with the ideologies and practices
of market-based, privatized structures.
Second, in the midst of substantial data suggesting that
privatization failed in New York City, although the data was sparse and
merited further research, CVH did find that some ESP vendors were
slightly better for program clients than others.127 In this sense, the CVH
report teaches that experimentation can be of value and program design
should, in the right circumstances, encourage this innovation and
learning. Any endorsement of experimentation implicitly endorses a
move away from specific, judicially enforceable hard rules of conduct by
welfare workers. Lawyers who have spent their careers seeking to create
and enforce detailed rules for the conduct of welfare workers on the
ground may find this suggestion, in some senses, near heresy.128
However, detailed, top-down rule making has historically been beset by
significant implementation challenges on the ground.129 If the
experimental, collaborative processes envisioned by new governance
theory were structured to ensure significant participation by and
accountability to low income communities, then those structures may be
more effective than the top-down regulatory structures in creating
positive welfare policy.130
127

THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 20. For example, vendor six month retention
figures varied from a low of 10% to a high of 20%. Id. at 33-34. While most vendors reported that
they could focus almost no resources and attention on services to promote job retention, one vendor
developed a program to enhance retention. Id. at 33-34, 37.
128
As a lawyer and clinician who relies on and continues to enforce hard rules on behalf
of my individual clients, I offer these proposals with a deep understanding of this hesitation.
129
See, e.g., Minow, supra note 3, at 1242-43.
130
The degree and nature of the “softness” is hotly contested by a variety of new
governance scholars. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 111, at 486-89. The concept of “softness”
refers, in part, to a move away from exclusive reliance on formal accountability mechanisms such as
sanctions for failure to comply with regulatory mandates and from a capacity to sue on the basis of
agency disregard for its own rules and a move toward an expansion of the means by which multiple
actors can participate in governance decision-making and the means by which the government can
intervene to control outcomes. Involved are a variety of inducements toward good behavior, such as
performance incentives. Lobel, supra note 111, at 390. In addition, new governance concepts can
include “variation in the communications of intention to control and discipline deviance.” Id. at 391.
A prime example of the new sanction regime is an increased reliance on government support of
multiple approaches to problem solving. “For example, recently adopted performance-based
regulation, designed to allow a range of reasonable interpretations that can meet the legal
requirement of comparable outcomes, promotes flexibility in the means adopted to achieve the
specified goals.” Id. at 391-92. Despite the variability in possible outcomes permissible under these
regulatory frameworks, many scholars argue that the frameworks do involve government retention
of significant coercive power. For example, Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel‟s vision of
democratic experimentalism, [a leading new governance concept,] . . . contemplates
mandatory participation in local problem-solving experiments under the discipline of
mandatory (but rolling) minimum performance standards set and periodically revised by
a central coordinating body, coupled with a reserved coercive power on the part of the
center to intervene for purposes of forcing reconsideration and reconfiguration of local
experiments gone seriously awry.
Karkkainen, supra note 111, at 488 (citing Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (citation omitted)). Despite these
arguments, however there is no question that allowing experimentation and diversity of approaches
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New governance theory offers a politically feasible and
potentially promising framework for change. However, the
accountability problem inherent in the privatization of welfare programs,
as revealed by CVH, is that the government‟s actual goals differed
substantially from those of the community. CVH sought programs that
would help move people from welfare into sustainable employment,
while, arguably, the government sought and endorsed a punishment and
caseload reduction mechanism.131 Looking at this program through the
framework of new governance theory, the governance process was
deficient in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, there were only two
constituents who were party to the creation of the program—the
government and the vendors.132 On a very basic level, if the structure
offered by new governance scholarship is one of broad-based, multiconstituent collaboration, then ESP was fundamentally flawed in that the
affected constituency was not at the table. And the solution is, at a
minimum, to bring the clients into the collaborative governance
structure. However, this statement begs the far more complicated
questions of how to bring a party or community into a collaboration
when (1) the parties to be included (here welfare recipients) have
substantially less political power than anyone else at the table, and (2)
even more disturbingly, the program at issue has historically been used to
subordinate the clients it purports to serve.
The effects of disproportionate power and subordination have
been the topic of some new governance scholarship. New governance
structures are least effective, in terms of holding true to the democratic
participatory values of administrative law, when key figures in a
particular system do not wield sufficient political power to participate in
these collaborative governance structures. As Bradley Karkkainen frames
it, “[a] central challenge for the governance model is . . . to understand
and endorsing a move to incentive- rather than mandate-based regimes raises a disturbing spectre for
recipients of welfare programs. In short, without hard rules, it is difficult to compel outcomes, and,
as the CVH report makes abundantly clear, when a set of rules focuses entirely on outcome, whether
it be in a performance-based contract or a performance-based regulation, the means of
implementation are not subject to rules. This is problematic for a variety of reasons. If there are no
rules about the means used, it is far more difficult for advocates to control interactions between the
government (or private party acting on behalf of the government) and the person being served by the
program. Even given their failures, traditional accountability mechanisms create a clear means for
intervention that does produce some level of results. For example, even given the structural problems
in the implementation of the settlement discussed at the beginning of this Article, it did allow the
mandating of hard rules and clear sanctions for systemic noncompliance. Abandoning such tools,
however limited, seems foolhardy. For this reason, although this Article advocates the investment of
advocacy resources in the creation of governance structures that augment community participation
and input, its suggestions should be critically evaluated in light of these risks.
131
See supra Part I.B.3.
132
See generally Gomez-Velez, supra note 76 (describing New York City‟s procurement
process).
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how collaborative environments can be nurtured to produce equitable
results, especially in settings where vast power imbalances exist.”133
Although there are valuable suggestions in the literature as to how to
begin to solve this problem134 and some discussion of moments when true
power was wielded by historically less-powerful groups in a new
governance framework,135 the practical problem of what governance
structures might be put in place to address these issues remains
underdeveloped.
In a new governance environment, problems with accountability
to any particular entity or interest group tend to arise when that entity or
group does not have the political power to affect process and outcome.
From the perspective of democratic accountability, when all relevant
entities or parties possess sufficient political power to participate in a
meaningful way in governance structures, accountability problems tend
not to arise. A few examples demonstrate this point.
In Down from Bureaucracy, Joel Handler examines the
consequences of decentralization, deregulation, and privatization for
“citizen empowerment.”136 He seeks to determine whether, given the shift
towards these new governance structures, “ordinary citizens—clients,
patients, teachers, students, parents, tenants, neighbors—have more or
fewer opportunities to exercise control over decisions that affect their
lives.”137 One prime example, discussed by Handler as one where
democratic accountability problems tend not to arise, is the use, under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), of the “Voluntary
Protection Program.”138 This program is a system of self-regulation in
which labor management committees are formed and work together to
develop and implement health and safety inspection standards and
protocols.139 In particular, Handler describes a study by Joseph Rees on
the use of voluntary regulatory structures in the California Cooperative
Compliance Program.140 In that program, joint labor management
committees acted as a surrogate for the OSHA inspector, and the role of
the OSHA inspector shifted from direct inspection to, in many
circumstances, “problem solving consultant.”141 According to Rees‟
study, this particular program was tremendously successful in the sense
that it resulted in far lower accident rates than comparable sites.142 Rees
133

Karkkainen, supra note 111, at 458-59.
See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 3, at 216-27; Minow, supra note 3, at 1266-70; see infra
note 165 and accompanying text.
135
See HANDLER, supra note 5, chs. 5-8.
136
See id at 5.
137
Id. at 5.
138
U.S. Dep‟t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Voluntary
Protection Programs, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
139
Id.
140
HANDLER, supra note 5, at 134-39.
141
Id. at 137.
142
Id. at 138.
134
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and Handler attribute this success to a variety of factors, the most
important of which, according to Handler, was the consistent presence of
strong unions at successful sites.143 In short, strong unions ensured that
labor participation was meaningful and that the interests of the workers
who would suffer accidents as a result of health and safety hazards were
consistently represented and accounted for.
In contrast to the OSHA example where the affected
constituency, the workers, possessed sufficient political power to compel
outcomes in their favor, is the implementation of the Workforce
Investment Act (“WIA”)144 in Springfield, Massachusetts. In this
example, the affected constituency, potential clients of the workforce
investment system, initially had little if any role in policy creation and
had to resort to an outsider, organizing strategy to augment their political
capital. WIA, in many ways a model new governance structure,
illustrates the continuing challenges for these structures. The WIAenabling legislation mandates the creation of local workforce investment
boards with broad membership, including client membership, and policy
setting authority.145
While WIA appears to function successfully in fostering
increased accountability in some localities,146 the Anti-Displacement
143

Id.
29 U.S.C. § 2832 (2006).
145
Id. § 2832. WIA incorporates many new governance concepts. The statute calls for the
creation of local workforce investment boards that must bring together a wide variety of stakeholders
in state and local boards to govern the provision of workforce development services. Id. § 2832(a)(d). Local boards include members from major constituencies and are responsible for local oversight
and administration. The local board negotiates performance measures with the state and is
accountable for meeting those performance measures. Id. § 2832(d)(5). Under WIA, the program
design is created through the participation of this broad group of actors, and jurisdictions function
under performance mandates that leave substantial room for experimentation. See id. § 2871
(describing the performance accountability system for workforce investment systems). WIA also
incorporates some accountability and transparency concepts from traditional administrative law.
WIA requires that proceedings of the workforce investment boards be open to the public and that
certain documents be available for public scrutiny. Id. § 2832(e). It also requires that plans be
available for comment prior to their approval. Id. § 2832(e). In theory, WIA structures create
opportunities for community participation, thus generating accountability. Lobel, supra note 111,
at 411.
146
Lobel cites, as a prime example of the effectiveness of WIA policy in a new
governance framework, the work of Project QUEST in San Antonio, Texas. Lobel, supra note 111 at
413-15. Project QUEST has been cited as one of the most successful job training programs in the
country. Paul Osterman, Organizing the US Labor Market: National Problems, Community
Strategies, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY 289 (Jonathan Zeitlin &
David Trubeck eds., 2003). It grew, beginning in 1991, from the work of community activists in San
Antonio who focused on the experiences and needs of low income members of its organizations. Id.
at 254. These organizing groups ultimately designed a program, Project QUEST, that provided long
term training, modest financial support of program participants during training, and direct linkages
with jobs at the conclusion of the program. Id. at 255. Project QUEST was not only tremendously
successful in its placement rate and the wage gains realized by participants, but it assisted in
reforming the community college system, altered the hiring patterns of employers, and augmented
the larger organizing goals of the community organizing groups that developed it. Id. at 256-57. The
relationship between the development and success of this program and WIA is not entirely clear.
Although causation is difficult to identify, it appears fair to speculate that Project QUEST‟s success
could have arisen, like that of the union workers in the OSHA context, initially from the political
144
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Project (the “A-DP”), an institutionally based membership organization
controlled by low-income people and located in Springfield,
Massachusetts,147 came to a very different conclusion about the
implementation of WIA policy in their jurisdiction. Strikingly, despite
the presence of new governance structures in the form of rolling
performance mandates and governance by state and local workforce
investment boards mandated to have community representation, clients
of the system appeared initially unable to participate meaningfully in
setting local WIA priorities.148 Nevertheless, the new governance
structure that characterizes WIA ultimately appeared to play some role in
facilitating significant accountability to the community.149
In 2001, using a strategy remarkably similar to that utilized by
CVH, the A-DP set out to monitor implementation of WIA in their
jurisdiction.150 Strikingly, the data revealed by CVH and the A-DP were
quite similar.151 The A-DP research revealed a program that failed to
provide access to the education, training, and other essential services
sought by the clients.152 Both programs failed to meet the clients‟ selfpower of the membership organizations that led to the formation and ongoing support of the project.
Once developed and backed by the considerable political power of the organizing groups, the
governance structures of WIA clearly supplemented rather than hindered local support of the
program.
147
Alliance to Develop Power, http://www.a-dp.org/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). The
mission of the A-DP is as follows:
The Alliance to Develop Power, (formerly Anti-Displacement Project) based in the three
counties of Western Massachusetts, has undertaken a set of bold initiatives in community
organizing, civic engagement, cooperative economic development, and community
building activities. ADP has instituted a model that prioritizes leadership development,
cooperative principles, and moving a membership into action, while simultaneously
winning major policy reforms, preserving thousands of units of housing, developing
community-owned businesses, and operating the region‟s only membership based low
wage and immigrant worker center affiliated with the local and national AFL-CIO.
Id.
148
ANTI-DISPLACEMENT PROJECT, FUTUREWORKS: ROADBLOCKS TO SUCCESS, HOW
FUTUREWORKS IS A DEAD END STREET FOR LOW WAGE WORKERS (2001) [hereinafter
FUTUREWORKS] (on file with author).
149
See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
150
FUTUREWORKS, supra note 148. The A-DP created a leader-driven testing project to
explore the training services provided under the WIA. Id. Over a two-month period, leaders went
into the WIA administered One-Stop Career Center and documented their experiences. The A-DP
identified thirty-two people who were either low-wage workers, unemployed, or welfare recipients.
Id. The “testers” were a multi-racial, multi-ethnic team who had varying needs and skill levels. The
testers made a total of forty-two visits to the Future Works One-Stop Career Center with specific
requests such as “I want to get computer training” or “I‟m looking for a job in childcare.” Id. Testers
also documented language access as well as the availability of services such as transportation and
childcare assistance. After each visit, the testers met with the testing coordinator and documented
their overall experience, what they asked for, and what they were told. Id.
151
It is, however, worth noting that the A-DP‟s research methods were significantly less
rigorous than CVH‟s, so limited conclusions can be drawn from it. Nevertheless, the results are
striking.
152
Everything testers asked for and documented was an eligible activity within the
Workforce Investment Act. None of the forty-two tests resulted in enrollment in a skill development
or training program. FUTUREWORKS, supra note 148.
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articulated needs and compromised the ability of poor people to succeed
in the labor market. In both programs, clients wanted to build skills that
would enable them to move towards economic sustainability, and in both
cases they were almost uniformly denied these opportunities and diverted
into the low-wage labor market.
The results revealed by CVH and the A-DP are, sadly, consistent
with the history of social welfare programs and policies. Although
government actors have, often in response to pressure from a variety of
fronts,153 designed some programs that have advanced the interests of
program participants, social welfare policy over the course of American
history has been dominated by systems and programs that serve primarily
to control against political unrest and maintain a workforce that has little
option but to accept unstable, low-wage employment.154 Social welfare
policy is often fairly characterized primarily as a means of labor market
control and a bulwark against social unrest rather than as a system to
meet the real needs of program participants. Social welfare policy is also
characterized by a long and shameful history of contributing to gender
and race subordination.155
Welfare reform after 1996 only added to this long history. While
welfare rolls have plummeted, former welfare recipients have been
pushed off of welfare and into the low-wage labor market.156 They are off
welfare, but on the whole they have not moved towards any form of
economic security. Jobs into which former welfare recipients have been
pushed fall to women who suffer financially in comparison to their male
153
A review of the extensive victories of advocates and communities in fighting on behalf
of those in poverty is beyond the scope of this Article. For an interesting history of the legal and
organizing movements, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993); see also MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK: FIGHTING
BACK: WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2000).
154
See generally FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE
POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971).
155
See, e.g., KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING
THE RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA‟S POOR (2001); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE:
HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994). See generally LOST GROUND: WELFARE
REFORM, POVERTY AND BEYOND (Randy Albelda & Ann Withorn eds., 2002); WHOSE WELFARE
(Gwendolyn Mink ed., 1999).
156
See HEATHER BOUSHEY & DAVID ROSNICK, CTR. ON ECON. & POL‟Y RESEARCH, JOBS
HELD BY FORMER WELFARE RECIPIENTS HIT HARD BY ECONOMIC DOWNTURN (2003), available at
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/welfare_reform_2003_09.pdf. According to Boushey
and Rosnick,

Nine industries, mostly in the service sector, account for the employment of nearly twothirds of all former welfare recipients. Overall, these are relatively low-wage industries:
in the second quarter of 2003, retail had an average hourly wage of $10.64 while food
establishments averaged $6.94 per hour (not including tips), both of which were much
lower than the $13.94 average for the private sector as a whole.
Id.; see also Juliet M. Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty
Law Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‟Y 201, 216 (2006); Julia R. Henly, Informal Support
Networks and the Maintenance of Low-Wage Jobs, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW
ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 179
(Frank Munger ed., 2002).
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colleagues in the workplace,157 and what few positive outcomes come
from welfare reform appear to fall disproportionately to white
recipients.158
When viewed through this historical lens, the results revealed by
CVH and the A-DP are not surprising. If in fact social welfare programs
have historically been and continue to be used to subordinate poor
communities, then one expects precisely these results: WIA would fail to
provide training that would render participants more expensive to
employers, and New York City contractors would be rewarded for
placing disproportionately high numbers of recipients in highly unstable
low-wage jobs, would not be penalized for failing to provide program
participants with any marketable skills, and would be rewarded for
punishing the vast majority of clients. The contracts CVH described, and
the welfare reform movement of which they are a key part, have the
effect of giving recipients little option but to subject themselves to the
vagaries of the low-wage labor market. The difference between this
privatized context and earlier forms of policy creation and
implementation is, then, not so much the effect of policies but the
specific structural contractual framework that has made successful
interventions by low-income communities even more difficult.
Thus, in important senses, the programs that CVH and the A-DP
faced and mobilized against were strikingly similar. However, the results
of the A-DP‟s work suggest that the new governance framework in WIA
may have provided more opportunities for the community group to
intervene in the governance structure in a way that increased
accountability to program clients. Using the results of this testing project
to mobilize substantial opposition to the WIA system in Springfield, the
A-DP reached an agreement with several key terms. The for-profit entity
running the one stop system was forced to transform into a “non-profit
governed by a local board of directors.”159 The A-DP was granted a seat
on the Regional Employment Board.160 In addition, the Regional
Employment Board agreed to
157
See Vicki Lens, Work Sanctions Under Welfare Reform: Are they Helping Women
Achieve Self-Sufficiency?, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‟Y 255, 281 n.130 (2006). Lens summarizes
various statistics showing that

[a]bout two-thirds of former recipients work in service sector jobs, such as retail, eating
and drinking establishments, and personal care services. Service sector jobs are often
predominantly female; for example, in 2004, 91.8% of nursing, psychiatric, and home
health aid workers were women, as were 89.7% of all maids and housekeeping cleaners.
These jobs are among the lowest paying of all occupations; for example the median
hourly wage for personal care and service occupations is $8.59 an hour.
Id.
158

See supra note 107.
Lori Stabile, Career Center Changes Focus: Now Non-Profit FutureWorks Meets
Demands of Community, THE REPUBLICAN, Dec. 9, 2001, at D2.
160
Lori Stabile, Jobs Group Marks Approval of Reforms, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS,
Nov. 1, 2001, at A11.
159
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set aside 50 percent of all federal WorkForce Investment Act funds for job
training and education for low-income adults, [ensure that] all low-income job
seekers receive training within 45 days of their initial entry to FutureWorks,
[create] a grievance process for career center customers and [establish] a
system to track wages and benefits in job placements as well as success rates
for training programs.161

Some of these successes appear to stem in part from the
participatory nature of the structures governing design and
implementation of workforce strategies under WIA. For example, the
existence of the regional board as a target of the A-DP‟s activism, the
award of a seat on that board to the A-DP, and the emphasis on
performance measurement are all closely related to new governance
theories of broad-based participation and performance-driven policy.162
In essence, by leveraging information accessed not primarily as a result
of the structure of WIA but instead as a result of an organizing and
research strategy, the A-DP raised their political capital sufficiently to
become members of the collaborative governance structure and to effect
significant change in WIA policy in favor of their constituency.
The A-DP and CVH examples teach important lessons about
how new governance structures can be formulated to increase
accountability. First, the A-DP story offers a caution that the mere
presence of broad participation inherent in WIA‟s enabling legislation or
any other proposed governance structure can be an empty shell if there is
no mechanism for substantive participation by the affected constituency.
Second, one of the key lessons of the story told by CVH and, by analogy
told by the A-DP is that programs that purport to serve welfare recipients
by assisting them in moving from welfare to work often actually function
very differently, rewarding contractors for punishing welfare recipients
and placing the vast majority of clients at the mercy of the low-wage
labor market without any enhancement of skills or marketability. In
effect, the use of contracting enabled the government to create and
perpetuate a program that subordinated rather than assisted its clients.
Thus, in addition to the multiple opportunities for collaboration
that new governance structures offer, there must be mechanisms to
counteract the tendency of both government and private entities to
perpetuate the subordination of clients in these programs. In short, if one
turns to the collaborative, experimental frameworks offered by new
161

Stabile, supra note 159. Throughout the campaign, The Springfield Union News and
other local papers provided extensive coverage of the campaign and its results. E.g., Stephanie
Barry, Angry Protests Invades Board Meeting, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, Mar. 22, 2001, at B4;
Elizabeth Zuckerman, Career Center Focus of Debate, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, Apr. 18, 2001, at
B3; Maureen Turner, Activists Inflicted the First Wound to a Local Job Center—Now the Political
Sharks Are Circling, THE VALLEY ADVOCATE, May 23, 2001; Chris Hamel, FutureWorks Center
Faces Shaky Future, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, June 3, 2001, at A13; Stephanie Barry, Changes in
the Works for Training Center, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, June 6, 2001, at A1.
162
See supra notes 115-123.
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governance scholarship, one must ensure that, for programs characterized
by disproportionate power and a history of subordination, the seat at the
table reserved for program clients is a real seat.
Finally, a note on community organizing and lawyering. A
central task of the administrative law mechanism that this Article seeks
to describe is the facilitation of substantive participation by welfare
recipients and other members of poor communities in the creation of
welfare policy. In this sense, this Article joins a variety of scholars and
activists who seek to use lawyering and legal structures as a means to
augment organizing campaigns.163 As argued above, given the history of
subordination, participation that rises above mere tokenism is difficult to
achieve without a significant alteration of the structures and mechanisms
of participation.164 However, even with a substantial reworking of
structures of collaborative modes of participation, if there is no person or
group of people who have the time, resources, and authenticity to speak
on behalf of communities, the project simply will not work. One viable
answer to this problem, which finds its roots in community lawyering
principles, is to turn to community-based grassroots organizing as the
best hope for capturing and amplifying the opinions, needs, and goals of
poor communities as well as exercising the power necessary to
communicate and negotiate for these needs. Thus, to the extent that that
this Article envisions structures that will create a “real seat at the table”
for affected communities, that seat must be reserved for grassroots
organizing groups.
IV.

COMMUNITY-BASED, RESEARCH-DRIVEN PARTICIPATION AS A
POTENTIAL RESPONSE

Part III recognized that, for a wide variety of reasons, new
governance structures provide a promising framework for creating
accountability in privatized social service programs only if these
structures create meaningful participation for those historically
subordinated beneficiaries of the programs. Drawing on the concepts of
collaboration, experimentation, and accountability at the root of new
governance theory, and the lessons from the successful work of CVH and
A-DP, this Part proposes the creation of social service contract
163

An expansive discussion of law and organizing is outside the scope of this Article.
However, some particularly important texts in the law and organizing field include: GERALD P.
LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO‟S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992);
Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1879
(2007); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48
UCLA L. REV. 443, 460-69 (2001); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
407 (1995); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699 (1988). For an extraordinarily useful introduction to the literature of
this growing field, see Loretta Price & Melinda Davis, Seeds of Change: A Bibliographic
Introduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 615 (2001).
164
See supra text accompanying notes 133-158.
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monitoring bodies as a means to render meaningful community
participation in the governance structure.165 These bodies would broaden
the participants in the formulation of policy and, essentially, would
provide a structural means to augment and build on the political power of
community-based groups in a way that would significantly enhance their
ability to participate in policy creation.
The proposed monitoring body is a separate entity that provides
substantial oversight over all aspects of contracting for social services. It
ensures that contracting processes are transparent and that the voices and
priorities of potential recipients of the service under contract have the
resources and structural mechanisms to meaningfully influence contract
structures.166
The monitoring body could be created by either the legislative
branch of local government or by publicly elected officials—
comptrollers, public advocates, and the like—whose offices provide an
oversight function. The body could receive substantial structural support
from private funding sources concerned with the accountability and
effectiveness of social service contracts. The move to reliance on private
entities to participate in governance, discussed extensively above,167
lends credence to proposals for the government to augment their capacity
by using private groups to assist in the funding and implementation of
their oversight responsibilities.168 The monitoring body could be a
separately staffed organization or an ongoing committee with
165
Some new governance scholars have suggested augmenting new governance structures
in much more limited forms with community-based oversight mechanisms. For example, in her
discussion of nursing homes in The Contracting State, Jody Freeman suggests ways that contracts
can be used to increase accountability and suggests methods that are in line with mine. For instance,
she suggests that “contracts could be instruments for diversifying sources of oversight. For example,
a contract could establish an ombudsman to represent nursing home residents, or it could demand
that nursing homes submit to periodic review by a community oversight committee.” Freeman,
supra note 15, at 202. Similarly, she suggests, in discussing Medicaid contracts (MCOs), that

[t]he contracts themselves could constitute crucial accountability mechanisms, enabling
state agencies to demand submission to independent third-party oversight, private
accreditation, and insurance requirements, among other things. Contracts might thus
serve as a means of enlisting additional nongovernmental entities such as community
groups and patient advocates to provide accountability.
Id. at 203-04 (citing examples in Massachusetts and Wisconsin that ensure community participation
in Medicaid contracting). Likewise, in discussing welfare-to-work contracts and concluding that
there is a significant lack of public accountability, Barbara Bezdek proposes the creation of a
“Community Congress to be held quarterly, to elicit the input of TANF customers and affected
communities, including locally operating employers, as a source of guidance for the services offered
by vendors.” Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished
Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1559, 1609 (2001). Finally, in Public and Private Partnerships, Martha Minow points to contract
law as a promising place of intervention to increase accountability in a privatized social service
environment. Minow, supra note 3, at 1267.
166
The subject area covered by the monitoring body could narrowly focus on specific
welfare programs or broadly focus on all human services contracts targeted at poor communities.
167
See supra Part I.A.
168
Given the emphasis on good governance among current private funders, efforts to fund
these initiatives through a combination of public and private sources may well be successful.
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organizational members, such as the local workforce investment boards,
mandated by the Workforce Investment Act, where membership and
function is mandated by statute as a precondition to the operation of the
program.169
A.

Specific Essential Elements170

To function successfully, monitoring bodies must have four
basic characteristics: (1) imposition of an altered notice and comment
structure in the procurement process; (2) mandates to enable the
monitoring body to design and implement an ongoing research agenda;
(3) substantial participation by program recipients in all aspects of the
monitoring bodies‟ work; and (4) a lack of conflict of interest between
the monitoring body and any potential bidders for government services.
1. Imposition of an Altered Notice and Comment Framework
into Public Procurement Processes
To advance the values of government transparency and public
accountability, as well as to create structures that lend additional political
strength to traditionally subordinated communities, procurement policies
must be amended to invite substantial input from both the public and the
monitoring body. This element is required because contract terms have
essentially taken the place of regulatory terms171 and contracting, in the
welfare-to-work area, is a closed, non-transparent process with little if
any means for affected communities to participate in the process.172 Thus,
any accountability structure must incorporate traditional public law
concepts of government transparency and opportunity for public
participation into the procurement process. The changes needed include:
the publication of proposed contract terms concerning performance
measures prior to their adoption, the imposition of a mandatory comment
period during which the monitoring body, along with the general public,
will have an opportunity to evaluate the proposed performance measures
and issue recommendations, and a requirement that the executive agency
publish responses to comments received both by the monitoring body
and the general public. These mechanisms would provide an opportunity
169

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
Before discussing the specific elements of the proposal, it is important to note that
there is variation across jurisdictions on questions of political and practical feasibility. In
jurisdictions where local government has a history of receptivity to advocacy and where organizing
and advocacy resources are plentiful, advocates may be successful in implementing very robust
forms of these proposals. In other jurisdictions, more political and practical compromises might be
necessary. For that reason, each subsection in this Part describes why the element is essential, what
the element is designed to accomplish, and then both the element‟s ideal implementation form and
some political compromises that may still have the desired effect.
171
See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
172
See supra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
170
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for both members of the community and the monitoring body to have
access to terms and to comment on them prior to their use in an executed
contract.
2. Mandates to Enable the Monitoring Body to Design and
Implement an Ongoing Research Agenda
Among the principles of new governance theory that are
particularly attractive in this context are the emphasis on
experimentation, evaluation, and the flexibility to redefine programs in
response to successes and failures.173 As every good social science
researcher knows, however, the quality of any evaluation always depends
on the quality of the questions asked and the ability of the researcher to
get real answers. The role of the proposed monitoring body is, in large
part, to provide ongoing evaluation of programs that is driven by the selfarticulated needs of program clients. In order to effectuate this agenda,
the body must be able to force government actors and private entities to
record and make publicly available data on outcomes identified by the
monitoring body, regardless of whether those outcomes are included in
the contract terms. In addition, the monitoring body must have ongoing
access to program participants as well as government and private staff
involved in designing and implementing the program.174
Like the element requiring substantial control by program
participants discussed in the next subsection, this research-focused
proposal represents a significant departure from traditional
administrative law concepts as well as from generally broadened
participatory governance concepts. Like the element of community
control, this element addresses the problems of new governance
structures when dealing with traditionally subordinated populations and
the need to explicitly account for subordination in designing contracting
processes. A robust ability to force collection and publication of data is
essential in lending the political weight to a monitoring body necessary
to render substantive its participation in the contracting process.
173

See supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
Inclusion of these elements would result in research even more effective than the
research CVH was able to conduct. Although CVH managed to draw significant conclusions from
the available data, it was hampered by the lack of collection of certain data points. For example, it
depended heavily on its own survey for important data points, such as knowledge about access to
education and training and disparities in outcome based on race, that would have been substantially
more convincing had the data come from the entire population. See THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra
note 8, app. A, at 19. Similarly, the A-DP depended entirely on its own sample data and thus issued
results based on a very small data set. FUTUREWORKS, supra note 148, § II. In addition, CVH‟s
experience in a subsequent study lends credence to an argument that more robust data access
provisions are essential. In contrast to CVH‟s experience in the research for The Revolving Door, in
researching the WeCARE program, CVH met substantially more resistance in providing data
through the Freedom of Information Law, which significantly impaired CVH‟s ability to draw
reliable conclusions. See supra note 71. Clearly, had these organizations been able to force data
collection on points of interest to them, they would have been able to monitor more effectively and
to be even more productive in making policy change recommendations.
174
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3. Substantial Participation by Program Recipients in All
Aspects of the Monitoring Bodies‟ Work
As discussed extensively in Part III, welfare programs have
historically participated in the subordination of poor communities. As
argued in Part II, any ability that communities and their advocates had to
render these programs accountable has been significantly eroded by
privatization. Although new governance structures are promising, they
will only be effective in creating programs that actually assist poor
communities if there is a mechanism in place to ensure that community
participation is meaningful. For all these reasons, perhaps the most
important attribute of any monitoring structure is ensuring that the body
includes substantial participation by welfare recipients and low-income
communities in all aspects of the body‟s work.
4. A Lack of Conflict of Interest Between the Monitoring Body
and Any Other Participants in the Contracting Process
To adhere to transparency and public participation principles, the
composition or structure of the monitoring body must function
independently of both the executive branch letting the contracts and any
potential bidders for government contracts. The exclusion of these two
entities ensures a more open conversation about these contracts, moving
them from an essentially closed, non-transparent negotiation between the
administrative agency and bidders into a process in which affected
participants can participate meaningfully.175
The importance of creating a monitoring body that is
independent of both the agency and the contractors was highlighted in a
subsequent study by CVH.176 After issuing The Revolving Door, CVH
began a study of the WeCare program, a program designed to assess and
assign individuals with physical and mental impairments.177 The contract
design for that program, unlike that of the ESP program, included
mandatory monitoring by an outside entity, and the agency in fact hired
an outside entity to do this.178 However, the entity in question had
numerous contracts with the agency, and CVH concluded that the
organization was not “entirely independent of HRA and the reviews that
[were] made available do not provide adequate evaluations of WeCARE
services.”179
Ideally, the monitoring body would be compromised of
organizations that are, with the exception of any funding provided to
175

At this point, in the jurisdictions discussed above, contracting leaves no room for
participation by any other entities, much less impacted community members. See supra Part II.
176
See generally FAILURE TO COMPLY, supra note 23.
177
Id. at 1.
178
Id. at 18.
179
Id. at 10.
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serve on the monitoring body, fiscally independent from government
simply because this would provide the maximum institutional
independence. In larger jurisdictions with a robust non-profit sector, such
an exclusion may be feasible. In others, where there are fewer potential
organizations available to play a role, compromises may have to be
made.180 Still, to ensure independence, the better choice is to exclude
government-funded entities entirely and rely solely on membership
organizations and organizations focused on research rather than include
participation by organizations whose ability to critically examine
government programs would be significantly compromised by funding
concerns.
B.

Political and Practical Feasibility

There is no question that there is a fundamental contradiction at
the heart of this proposal. The government‟s historic and current role in
the creation and implementation of social welfare policy is so
fundamentally intertwined with subordination that relying on
government to create and monitor contracts for provision of social
services will inevitably lead to a continuation of this history of
subordination. In light of this, there is a certain irony in advocating for
the creation of monitoring bodies by and with the government. It seems
that if this history is determinative, then in some sense the proposal is
doomed either to be entirely politically unfeasible to implement or, if
implemented, to be co-opted in a way that fundamentally undermines its
strength. My belief that this is, perhaps, not entirely true comes from two
observations. First, in a very real sense, the technocratic efficiency
justifications that are the public face of privatization are also its Achilles‟
heel. CVH‟s analysis of outcomes, when framed as a matter of economic
efficiency, bolsters less politically charged and highly credible assertions
that funds are being wasted and may provide motivation for other
180
Beyond the exclusion of the contractor and potential bidders, however, are more
difficult issues concerning, primarily, the role of non-profit entities that are not potential bidders but
that do rely on government funds for their operation. The non-profit sector has historically played
and to this day plays an enormously important role both in the provision of social welfare services
and in bringing attention to the needs of low-income communities. Bezdek, supra note 165, at 1566.
At the same time, as the government turns more and more to the private sector to perform functions
previously performed by government agencies, the role of the non-profit sector in this work has
substantially increased and, in many circumstances changed. Id. at 1565-66; see generally MIMI
ABRAMOVITZ, HUNTER COLLEGE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK, IN JEOPARDY: THE IMPACT OF
WELFARE REFORM ON NONPROFIT HUMAN SERVICE AGENCIES IN NEW YORK CITY (2002),
available at http://www.unitedwaynyc.org/pdf/in_jeopardy.pdf (discussing the enormous adverse
impact of welfare reform on the economic and social security of clients and describing the impact of
those changes on the the non profit sector). As the government provides more and more of the funds
supporting the non-profit sector, the ability of these organizations to zealously advocate against
government policy is significantly compromised. Among the difficult questions a jurisdiction would
face in implementing these proposals is whether to exclude from membership in the monitoring body
entities that receive funding from the same branch of government letting the contract but who do not
intend to bid on the contract at issue.
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branches of government or quasi-governmental bodies to step in to play
some role in improving outcomes. While that does not lead, per se, to
community-led monitoring, it does provide less overtly political means
for communities to advocate that additional oversight is needed to
improve results.
The second reason for hope is the presence, in at least some
communities, of community-based, membership-led groups like CVH
and the A-DP. The creation of a monitoring body, even in a weaker form
than proposed here, has the potential to create a point of intervention and
an additional site through which these organizations can assert
themselves and engage in the politically contested questions of whose
interests social welfare programs should serve. And, in turn, participation
in such a body could raise the institutional capacity of less strongly
established community-based groups that might lead to increased
political power. The A-DP story lends credence to that theory because
the local Workforce Investment Board, which, despite a facial
requirement of community participation, was originally not serving the
needs of the intended recipients of WIA services, did ultimately provide
a point of intervention for the A-DP.181 As a result of their report, the ADP was able to advocate for the restructuring of the local workforce
development system in a way that made it more responsive to
community needs.182 Similarly, the monitoring body could create points
of intervention through which community organizations could intervene
to affect welfare policy.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I want to say just a few words about limited advocacy
resources. Having spent the better part of a decade working on welfare
issues in New York City, I am all too aware of the limited resources
available to advocate on behalf of welfare recipients and of the incredible
importance of continuing to enforce what few procedural, substantive,
constitutional, and statutory protections still apply. On the other hand,
given the scale of privatization and its broad applicability to the wide
range of programs traditionally run by the government, I urge that
existing efforts to confront privatization183 be expanded and that others in
the welfare advocacy community join forces with community-based
organizations to advocate for policies that respond directly to
privatization.

181

See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
183
In the welfare area, in addition to the work of Community Voices Heard and the AntiDisplacement Project highlighted in this Article, the National Center of Law and Economic Justice
works extensively on these issues. See National Center for Law and Economic Justice, Privatization
& Modernization, http://www.nclej.org/key-issues-privatization.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
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